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Anything You Can Use, I Can Use 
Better: Examining the Contours of Fair 
Use as an Affirmative Defense for 
Theatre Artists, Creators, and Producers 
Benjamin Reiser* 
Broadway is booming. In a post-Hamilton world, ticket sales 
and attendance records for the commercial theatre industry  
continue to break season after season. At the same time (and  
perhaps not so coincidentally), litigation against theatre artists,  
creators, and producers has surged, especially in the realm of  
copyright infringement. Many theatre professionals accused  
of infringement in recent years have employed the doctrine of  
fair use—codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107—as an affirmative defense 
against such claims. This Note explores cases involving theatre  
professionals in which fair use was examined and contends that  
they collectively reflect broader historical trends in fair use  
jurisprudence. In particular, this Note argues that the fair use  
doctrine remains analytically unclear and difficult to follow and 
proposes that the transformative use inquiry—which was  
articulated in 1994 by the Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc.—be abandoned in future fair use analyses in favor 
of expressly following the four statutory factors enumerated in 17 
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U.S.C. § 107. Lastly, this Note directly addresses theatre artists,  
creators, and producers, and advises them that when writing,  
developing, or mounting a new theatrical production, any reliance 
on the fair use doctrine ought to be avoided. Instead, alternative  
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INTRODUCTION 
When Lin-Manuel Miranda’s musical Hamilton opened at the 
Richard Rodgers Theatre on Broadway in 2015, theatre critics 
across the nation deemed the show a “game changer” in the history 
and landscape of American musical theatre.1 Peter Marks of The 
Washington Post called it “blazingly original, restlessly innova-
tive.”2 Ben Brantley, the co-chief theater critic of The New York 
Times, not only humorously recommended that people “mortgage 
their houses and lease their children” to acquire Hamilton tickets, he 
wrote also that the show is “proof that the American musical is . . . 
evolving in ways that should allow it to thrive and transmogrify in 
years to come.”3 
It is noteworthy that a show so universally considered to be 
“fresh”4 and “groundbreaking”5 is also one that substantially—and 
often unabashedly—uses and borrows from artistic works from the 
past. Indeed, in just about every one of Hamilton’s songs,6 some  
reference can be identified, either obviously or covertly, from the 
worlds of musical theatre, pop, R&B, hip-hop, or rap.7 For example, 
 
1 David Rooney, Critic’s Notebook: Why ‘Hamilton’ Counts as a Legitimate Game-
Changer, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/ 
news/critics-notebook-why-hamilton-counts-818677 [https://perma.cc/QE42-DY7F]. 




3 Ben Brantley, Review: ‘Hamilton,’ Young Rebels Changing History and Theater, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/07/theater/review-hamilton 
-young-rebels-changing-history-and-theater.html [https://perma.cc/LX9U-E6E9]. 
4 Alisa Solomon, How ‘Hamilton’ Is Revolutionizing the Broadway Musical, NATION 
(Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-hamilton-is-revolutionizing-the-
broadway-musical/ [https://perma.cc/CWH2-PX48]. 
5 Marilyn Stasio, Broadway Review: ‘Hamilton,’ VARIETY (Aug. 6, 2015), 
https://variety.com/2015/legit/reviews/hamilton-review-broadway-1201557679/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZMW8-XZ2Q]. 
6 Hamilton is noteworthy for being a sung-through musical, meaning the full production 
is entirely sung or rapped through, with an occasional spoken line or two. The 2015 cast 
album for Hamilton contains forty-six tracks. 
7 See generally Here Are All the Classical Music References in Hamilton, CLASSIC FM 
(Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.classicfm.com/discover-music/classical-music-hamilton-lin-
manuel-miranda/ [https://perma.cc/X2JS-FUJK]; see also Howard Ho, All the Theatre 
References in Hamilton, YOUTUBE (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=rANf1uuiTKE [https://perma.cc/35YA-JBXE]; Forrest Wickman, All the Hip-
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the song “Ten Duel Commandments” in Act I of Hamilton borrows 
both its title and rhythmic structure from The Notorious B.I.G.’s 
1997 song “Ten Crack Commandments.”8 During George  
Washington’s introductory song, “Right Hand Man,” he calls  
himself “[T]he model of a modern major general / The venerated 
Virginian veteran whose men are all / Lining up, to put me up on a 
pedestal.”9 Lyrically, Washington’s lines nearly exactly replicate a 
section from the “Modern Major-General’s Song” from W.S.  
Gilbert and Arthur Sullivan’s 1879 operetta, The Pirates of  
Penzance.10 At the end of “Say No to This,” during which Alexander 
Hamilton begins an extramarital affair, Hamilton sings the line, 
“Nobody needs to know”—the exact title of a song sung by lead 
character Jamie in Jason Robert Brown’s 2001 musical The Last 
Five Years, as Jamie begins an extramarital affair.11 And this is just 
to name a few.12 
For readers of this Note who may be imagining the phrase  
“copyright infringement”13 surrounded by flashing red lights while 
reading these references, there is no need for alarm. Much of Mi-
randa’s work in Hamilton, if challenged in court by prior copyright 
holders, could ostensibly be protected by the principle of fair use.14 
 
Hop References in Hamilton: A Track-by-Track Guide, SLATE (Sept. 24, 2015), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/browbeat/2015/09/24/hamilton_s_hip_hop_references_all_th
e_rap_and_r_b_allusions_in_lin_manuel.html [https://perma.cc/3PMA-REUV]; Robert 
Viagas & Adam Hetrick, From Last Five Years to the Notorious B.I.G.—Hamilton Shout-
Outs and References You Need to Know, PLAYBILL (July 29, 2015), http://www.
playbill.com/article/from-last-five-years-to-the-notorious-big-hamilton-shout-outs-and-
references-you-need-to-know-com-355053 [https://perma.cc/VB34-CC43]. 
8 Lin-Manuel Miranda, “Ten Duel Commandments” Lyrics, https://genius.com/ 
7860689 [https://perma.cc/9WZB-MC36]. 
9 Lin-Manuel Miranda, “Right Hand Man” Lyrics, https://genius.com/7860938 
[https://perma.cc/FX9E-w85H]. 
10 Id. 
11 Lin-Manuel Miranda, “Say No to This” Lyrics, https://genius.com/7860613 
[https://perma.cc/D9H4-DF4S]. 
12 See sources cited supra note 7. 
13 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (in which the 
Supreme Court succinctly articulates the two elements that a plaintiff must prove to 
establish a prima facie case of copyright infringement: “(1) ownership of a valid copyright, 
and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original”). 
14 See generally Deidre Davis, Living to See His Glory Days: Why Hamilton’s Lin 
Manuel Miranda Is Not Liable for Copyright Infringement, But Other Writers and 
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Fair use is a legal doctrine which permits the use of copyrighted  
material for specific purposes such as commentary, criticism,  
parody, research, teaching, or scholarship.15 Furthermore, the  
Supreme Court has decided that the transformative nature of a work 
may operate as a key factor in fair use analysis, and in fact, legal 
scholars have noted that the transformative use inquiry “has come 
overwhelmingly to dominate the fair use doctrine.”16 If a party uses 
copyrighted material in a way that qualifies as fair use, the use would 
not be considered copyright infringement.17 However, as this  
Note later explores, the fair use inquiry is inherently fact-specific,  
and the lack of a bright line for the doctrine has caused much  
analytical ambiguity. 
Nonetheless, in recent years, litigation has increased by under-
lying rights owners asserting copyright infringement claims against 
professionals in the theatre industry.18 These defendants have  
frequently employed the fair use defense against these claims, and, 
more often than not, have done so successfully.19 These cases effec-
tively demonstrate a growing “power” of the fair use defense.20  
Further, these cases collectively act as a microcosm to illustrate 
three contemporary trends in regard to fair use: (1) fair use has very 
little analytical consistency, and is, in fact, rather a mishmash of 
analysis; (2) the determination of a parody as a fair use is less than 
clear; and (3) the transformative use inquiry is both very popular and 
 
Composers Are, 17 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 92 (2017); see also Larry Iser, 
‘Hamilton’ Part II—Why Lin-Manuel Miranda Didn’t Really Need to Clear the Music, 
FORBES (June 27, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalentertainment/2016/06/27/ 
hamilton-part-ii-why-lin-manuel-miranda-didnt-really-need-to-clear-the-music/#9833e96 
45d51 [https://perma.cc/3648-58M6]. 
15 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018); see also Rich Stim, What Is Fair Use?, STAN. U. LIBR. 
COPYRIGHT & FAIR USE OVERVIEW, https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/fair-use/what-is-
fair-use/ [https://perma.cc/89P2-FPWZ]. 
16 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715 
(2011); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (stating 
that “the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the 
creation of transformative works”). 
17 See Stim, supra note 15. 
18 Jason Aylesworth, The Evolution of Fair Use, 29 N.Y. ST. BAR ASS’N ENT. ARTS & 
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deeply problematic. Altogether, this Note examines fair use in  
litigation against artists, creators, and producers in the theatre indus-
try by underlying rights owners asserting a claim of copyright  
infringement. In the end, this Note concludes that while fair use has 
become an increasingly strong defense for such defendants, it  
nevertheless remains particularly imprecise and unpredictable in its 
analysis. In particular, this Note pushes back against the swelling 
popularity of the transformative use inquiry. 
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I details what fair use is 
and briefly explores the evolution of the doctrine within the broader 
history of American copyright law. It then examines various cases, 
notable and recent, in industries outside of commercial theatre in 
order to observe broader trends in fair use jurisprudence. The first 
section of Part II surveys cases against theatre professionals in 
which fair use was asserted. The second section of Part II contends 
that the theatre cases collectively reflect broader historical trends in 
fair use jurisprudence, and ultimately challenges the transformative 
use inquiry and its prevalence in contemporary fair use analysis.  
Finally, Part III shifts toward an intended reading audience of  
theatre artists, creators, and producers—rather than an audience of 
lawyers and legal scholars. Part III asserts that when writing,  
developing, or mounting a new theatrical production, theatre artists, 
creators, and producers should ultimately avoid any sort of reliance 
on the fair use doctrine. It then concludes by offering three best  
practices by which theatre professionals may attempt to circumvent 
copyright litigation altogether: (1) creating wholly original work  
or borrowing from the public domain; (2) obtaining all potentially  
relevant licenses, clearances, and/or permissions; and (3) if ulti-
mately necessary, preparing a remarkably sturdy defense for  
potential fair use analysis in court. 
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I.  “WHAT’S THE STATE OF OUR NATION?”21: THE EVOLUTION OF 
FAIR USE IN AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 
A. The History of the Doctrine 
To engage in a holistic analysis of fair use in contemporary 
cases, it is important to understand how the doctrine came to exist 
within the greater context of American copyright law. The history 
of this body of law dates as far back as 1710, when the Parliament 
of Great Britain enacted the Statute of Anne, widely considered to 
be the world’s first codified copyright statute.22 The law worked,  
in essence, to prevent entire appropriation by prohibiting exact  
reprintings of covered works.23 However, the Statute of Anne did 
not address “fractional copying,” which, in turn, created issues for 
English authors and publishers who found the statute operating  
adversely to their interests.24 Eventually, English courts tested the 
scope of copyright under the Statute of Anne.25 Ultimately, Ameri-
can colonists saw conceptions of a copyright regime in England 
prior to the founding of the new nation. 
The United States Constitution came into force in 1789. Article 
I, section 8, clause 8—now commonly called the “Intellectual Prop-
erty Clause”—gave Congress its power to “promote the Progress  
of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to  
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries.”26 The following year, the country passed its 
first articulation of federal copyright law: the Copyright Act of 
1790.27 Much of the 1790 Act borrowed directly from England’s 
 
21 A lyric from the song “My Shot” from the 2015 musical Hamilton. 
22 Act for the Encouragement of Learning (Statute of Anne), 8 Ann., c. 19 § 1 (1710) 
(Eng.). 
23 Matthew Sag, The Pre-History of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371, 1381 (2011). 
24 Id. 
25 See, e.g., Gyles v. Wilcox, 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 2 Atk. 141 (1741) (No. 130). For details, 
the original transcripts of this document are located at The National Archives at Kew, 
London (TNA), C33/375/274 and C11/1828/27, m.1–4. For a commentary on the case, see 
Ronan Deazley, Commentary on Gyles v. Wilcox (Atkyn’s Reports) (1741), PRIMARY 
SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450–1900), http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/ 
showRecord?id=commentary_uk_1741 [https://perma.cc/4L9-6RGN]. 
26 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
27 Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831). 
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Statute of Anne, as both statutes granted the rights to print, reprint, 
publish, and vend the copyrighted work.28 However, the 1790 Act 
only offered fourteen-year-long copyright terms, and was limited to 
protecting specific works such as “maps, Charts, And books.”29 In 
an update forty-one years later, the Copyright Act of 1831 revised 
many of these terms, extending the first term of  
protection to twenty-eight years and expanding the subject matter of 
copyright to include musical compositions.30 
A decade after the passage of the 1831 Act, the fair use doctrine 
was born.31 Justice Joseph Story, then sitting as a circuit judge in 
Massachusetts, authored the opinion in Folsom v. Marsh.32 In  
Folsom, the plaintiff, who had authored an 866-page biography of 
George Washington, sued the defendant for copying 353 pages  
verbatim to publish a work of his own.33 Prior to Justice Story’s  
decision, courts—operating then under the force of the Copyright 
Act of 1831—had held that such an abridgment did not infringe the 
copyright of another author, “because in doing so the second author 
produced a new book.”34 Following this logic, the defendant relied 
heavily on the “abridgment doctrine”35 by arguing that an author 
“has a right to quote, select, extract or abridge from another, in the 
composition of a work essentially new.”36 
To the contrary, deeming their work an infringement indicative 
of no more than “the facile use of . . . scissors,” Justice Story found 
the defendants guilty of infringement.37 Justice Story rejected the 
abridgment doctrine and held that because the author owned the  
 
28 L. Ray Patterson, Understanding Fair Use, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 250 
(1992). 
29 See Copyright Act of 1790, art. 1. 
30 See Act to Amend the Several Acts Respecting Copy Rights, 4 Stat. 436 (1831); see 
also Benjamin W. Rudd, Notable Dates in American Copyright, 1783–1969, Q.J. LIBR. 
CONGRESS (Apr. 1971), https://copyright.gov/history/dates.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7FR-
KVZY]. 
31 See Patterson, supra note 28, at 255. 
32 See generally Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
33 Id. at 345. 
34 See Patterson, supra note 28, at 255. 
35 Id. 
36 See Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344. 
37 See id. at 345. 
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entire copyright, it was not a defense to appropriate part, but not the 
whole, of the work.38 In Folsom, Justice Story penned the first  
articulation of the factors that courts still use today in fair use  
analysis:  
In short, we must often . . . look to the nature and  
objects of the selections made, the quantity and value 
of the materials used, and the degree in which the use 
may prejudice the sale or diminish the profits, or  
supersede the objects of the original work. Many 
mixed ingredients enter into the discussion of such 
questions.39  
By Justice Story’s logic, then, when a judge combines these “mixed  
ingredients” and finds the use of a copyrighted material to be fair on 
balance, the use would not constitute copyright infringement.40 It is 
evident, then, that from the introduction of fair use analysis in the 
United States, judges intended for it to involve a holistic and varied 
approach rather than a bright-line standard.41 
Following Folsom in 1841, fair use developed as a common law 
doctrine in American courts for nearly a century and a half.42 Fair 
use was ultimately codified when President Gerald Ford signed into 
law the Copyright Act of 1976.43 Among its many significant 
changes, the 1976 Act—which remains the central basis for  
copyright law in the United States today—broadened copyright to 
include the rights to reproduce, adapt, publicly distribute, publicly 
perform, and publicly display the copyrighted work.44 Section 107 
of the Act specifically set forth the four factors to be considered 
when determining whether a particular use of a copyrighted work is 
a fair use: 
 
38 See id. at 348. 
39 Id.  
40 This is the opposite of the holding in Folsom, in which Justice Story did not find the 
“mixed ingredients” of the defendants’ argument to sufficiently lead to a finding of fair 
use. Id. at 349. 
41 See generally Folsom, 9 F. Cas. 342. 
42 Jay Dratler Jr., Distilling the Witches’ Brew of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 43 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 233, 235 (1988). 
43 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). 
44 See id. § 106. 
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(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes;  
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;  
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used 
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for 
or value of the copyrighted work.45 
The statute, however, did not establish any additional guidelines 
or strategies for analyzing the four articulated factors, nor did it  
prioritize any one as more important than another. As a result, since 
the codification of fair use in 17 U.S.C. § 107, courts have  
grappled—rather messily—with how to consistently apply the  
doctrine. To be sure, Congress expressly intended for courts to “be 
free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case 
basis.”46 But for some judges, this has proven tricky: some consider 
fair use to be “so flexible as to virtually defy definition.”47 In fact, 
in a pivotal 1990 article titled Toward a Fair Use Standard, Judge 
Pierre N. Leval wrote that the fair use statute both “leav[es] open the 
possibility that other factors may bear on the question” but  
“identifies none.”48 Questions as to the appropriate balancing of the 
four factors have persisted in judicial scholarship since 1976.49 
In 1994, the Supreme Court offered a major answer to questions 
surrounding fair use when it emphasized the particular importance 
of the first factor: the “purpose and character” of the use.50 In  
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Court determined that the 
more that a new work is found to be “transformative,” the less sig-
nificant the other three factors should weigh on an ultimate finding 
of fair use.51 
 
45 See id. § 107. 
46 See H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680. 
47 Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1392 (6th 
Cir. 1996) (citing Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968)). 
48 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (1990). 
49 See, e.g., id.; see also Netanel, supra note 16, at 720. 
50 17 U.S.C. § 107; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 
(1994). 
51 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
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In Campbell, Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. filed suit against the rap 
group 2 Live Crew, claiming that the group’s 1989 song “Pretty 
Woman” infringed on Acuff-Rose’s copyright of Roy Orbison’s 
1964 song “Oh, Pretty Woman.”52 The district court granted  
summary judgment for 2 Live Crew, holding that their song was a 
parody that made fair use of the original song.53 However, the Sixth 
Circuit reversed this decision and held that the commercial nature of 
2 Live Crew’s parody made the song’s use presumptively unfair.54 
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that 2 Live 
Crew’s commercial parody of Orbison’s song constituted a fair 
use.55 In an opinion by Justice David Souter, the Court took note of 
the appeals court’s fixation on the “commercial nature” of 2 Live 
Crew’s song.56 Justice Souter wrote that the lower court erred in  
giving “virtually dispositive weight” to that element of fair use  
analysis, and that the statute made it clear that a work’s  
commercial nature is simply one of four total statutory factors to be 
considered altogether.57 
In Campbell, Justice Souter emphatically endorsed the  
transformative use inquiry in determining whether an unauthorized 
use of a copyrighted work is fair.58 In fact, his opinion draws heavily 
from Justice Story’s words in Folsom, and concludes that the focus 
of fair use analysis is to see “whether the new work merely  
‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation.”59 Although  
Justice Souter noted that transformative use is not necessarily  
required in order to find fair use, he nevertheless argued that the  
 




56 Id. at 583 (and note that leading up to Campbell in 1994, the 1985 case of Harper & 
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises inclined courts to regard the fourth factor as the 
most important). 
57 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584. 
58 David Tan, The Lost Language of the First Amendment in Copyright Fair Use: A 
Semiotic Perspective of the “Transformative Use” Doctrine Twenty-Five Years On, 26 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 311, 311 (2016). 
59 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1841)). 
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goal of copyright is “generally furthered by the creation of  
transformative works.”60 
Additionally, the Supreme Court described fair use in Campbell 
as “an affirmative defense.”61 As such, the defendant bears the  
burden of proving that their use of a copyrighted material was fair.62 
B. Fair Use and the Current State of Play 
For a doctrine that has developed in American copyright law for 
well over two centuries, it is rather remarkable how unpredictable 
and uncertain fair use remains for copyright holders and users alike 
across an array of industries. For years after the 1976 codification of 
17 U.S.C. § 107, courts widely regarded the fourth statutory  
factor—the effect of a use on the market—to be “undoubtedly the 
single most important element of fair use.”63 But after Campbell in 
1994, the first statutory factor and the transformative use inquiry 
came to instead dominate fair use analysis.64 Moreover, in a  
perpetually changing, twenty-first-century world, fair use analysis 
has become even less ascertainable for certain kinds of technologies; 
in fact, some scholars assert that fair use analysis ought to be aban-
doned entirely, and argue that it is not suited to “counterbalance . . . 
copyright owner’s rights” in today’s society.65 
 
60 Id. (Justice Souter also stated that the goal of copyright is “to promote science and the 
arts”). 
61 Id. at 590. 
62 Lydia Pallas Loren, Fair Use: An Affirmative Defense?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 685, 687 
(2015). 
63 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). 
64 Jiarui Liu, An Empirical Study of Transformative Use in Copyright Law, 22 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 163, 163 (2019) (stating that “of all the dispositive decisions that upheld 
transformative use, 94% eventually led to a finding of fair use”); see also Benjamin 
Moskowitz, Toward a Fair Use Standard Turns 25: How Salinger and Scientology Affected 
Transformative Use Today, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1057, 1058 
(2015) (noting “the increased use of transformative use as a fair use defense”); Netanel, 
supra note 16, at 719 (finding “a dramatic increase in defendant win rates on fair use that 
correlates with the courts’ embrace of the transformative use doctrine”). 
65 Gideon Parchamovsky & Philip J. Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 
91 (2010). 
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To the contrary, however, courts continue to mold fair use in 
order to adapt the doctrine to new technologies and industries.66 
While this has left us still with a “vague [and] open-ended analysis,” 
it is nonetheless helpful to examine recent notable cases to  
illuminate the current state of play for fair use.67 
For example, in 2007, the Ninth Circuit determined that the use 
of thumbnails in an image search engine constitutes fair use.68 In 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., the plaintiff, a company which 
owned the copyrights to photographs of nude models, sued Google, 
Inc. and Amazon.com, Inc., and argued that the defendants had  
infringed on their copyrights by displaying their photographs on 
their sites through “thumbnail images and in-line linking.”69 The 
court found that the display of thumbnail images of the copyright 
holder’s photographs was a fair use by focusing primarily on the 
first statutory factor in tandem with the transformative use inquiry 
articulated in Campbell.70 According to the court, because a search 
engine “transforms [an] image into a pointer directing a user to a 
source of information,” it effectively renders any such copyrighted 
material used therein a fair use.71 The court even drew from the  
theory behind parody as a form of fair use: it articulated that a search 
engine provides a “social benefit” similar to that of parody, as both 
lead to the creation of new works by commenting on previous 
work.72 In this particular case, then, the “new work” was an  
electronic reference tool.73 In Perfect 10, the Ninth Circuit ushered 
in a twenty-first-century era of fair use jurisprudence: not only 
would the transformative use inquiry apply to traditional works, 
such as songs like “Oh, Pretty Woman,” but it could also be applied 
to Internet- and computer-related works. 
 
66 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) 
(holding that unauthorized home videotaping of television broadcasts for non-commercial 
“time-shifting” purposes was fair use). 
67 See Parchamovsky & Weiser, supra note 65, at 93. 
68 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007). 
69 Id. at 1154, 1157. 
70 Id. at 1164. 
71 Id. at 1165. 
72 Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)). 
73 Id. 
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In 2013, the Second Circuit “moved the dial further” toward 
finding transformative use in cases involving the assertion of a fair 
use defense.74 In Cariou v. Prince, photographer plaintiff Patrick 
Cariou brought a copyright infringement action against Richard 
Prince, an appropriation artist who used several of Cariou’s photo-
graphs in a series of paintings and collages he exhibited at a gal-
lery.75 Agreeing that Prince’s work constituted infringement, the 
district court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.76 On appeal, the Second 
Circuit reversed the district court’s contention with regard to 
twenty-five of the thirty photos in question, and found those works 
to be sufficiently transformative.77 The twenty-five photos that the 
appellate court identified “manifest[ed] an entirely different  
aesthetic from Cariou’s photographs.”78 The court further held that 
the law “imposes no requirement that a [secondary] work comment 
on the original [for it] to be considered transformative, and a  
secondary work may constitute a fair use even if it serves some pur-
pose other than those . . . identified in the preamble to the statute.”79 
Scholars have noted that the Cariou case represents one of the  
widest expansions of the definition of transformative use.80 Further, 
some consider the case as having effectively relaxed the standards 
for transformativeness “such that a work need only show ‘new  
expression, meaning, or message.’”81 
The transformative use inquiry saw another expansion of its 
scope in 2015, when the Second Circuit again employed it as a  
rationale for finding that it was fair use for Google to digitally copy 
entire books from library collections for its Google Books project.82 
 
74 Marc D. Ostrow, Are Transformative Fair Use Principles Foul to Musicians?, 
LEXOLOGY (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=57b1ddd6-
f6e7-47b6-aac3-4d2ffeb9bc64 [https://perma.cc/LM2J-W622]. 
75 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 2013). 
76 Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d in part, vacated in 
part, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
77 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 698–99. 
78 Id. at 706. 
79 Id. (referring to 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018)). 
80 Recent Case, Copyright Law—Fair Use—Second Circuit Holds That Appropriation 
Artwork Need Not Comment on the Original to Be Transformative, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
1228, 1228 (2014) [hereinafter Recent Case, Copyright Law]. 
81 Id. 
82 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 207–08 (2d Cir. 2015). 
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In Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., Google entered into several 
agreements with some of the world’s major research libraries to  
advance its Google Books search database.83 In the process, Google 
scanned more than twenty million books—without permission or 
payment of license fees to any original copyright holders—and 
made the digital copies available to its library partners.84 Plaintiffs 
alleged that because Google lacked permission to copy from the 
rights holders, it committed copyright infringement.85 Holding that 
all four factors of statutory analysis favored fair use, the Southern 
District of New York held that Google’s digitization and use of the 
works was fair use, and the Second Circuit agreed.86 
Writing for the court, Circuit Judge Pierre N. Leval—author of 
the influential 1990 “Toward a Fair Use Standard” article— 
explained that for the first factor, Google’s “making of a digital copy 
to provide a search function”87 was a transformative use and  
“augment[ed] public knowledge by making available information 
about Plaintiffs’ books without providing the public with a  
substantial substitute for matter protected by the Plaintiffs’  
copyright interests.”88 Next, the court concluded that the second  
factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, favored fair use because 
the secondary use “transformatively provides valuable information 
about the original, rather than replicating protected expression in a 
manner that provides a meaningful substitute for the original.”89 
Third, looking to the amount and substantiality of the portion used, 
the court found that Google’s copying of entire texts to enable the 
Google Books full-text search function “was not dispositive of a 
finding of fair use because Google limited the amount of text it  
 
83 Id. at 208. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 207. 
86 See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d 
sub nom. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Authors 
Guild, 804 F.3d at 207. 
87 Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 207. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 220. 
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displayed to users in search engine results.”90 Fourth and finally,  
analyzing the market effect of the use, the court decided that the 
manner by which Google displays its Books project “do[es] not pro-
vide a significant market substitute for the protected aspects of the 
originals.”91 Yet again, an appeals court found that a transformative 
purpose overrode a copyright infringement claim. 
A very recent exploration of the bounds of fair use by the Second 
Circuit came in the 2018 case of Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, 
Inc.92 Defendant TVEyes operated a media-monitoring service 
which “aggregated news reports into [a] searchable database.”93 
TVEyes worked to offer a range of public, private, and non-profit 
customers the text-searchable access to television and radio  
programming clips—meaning, the ability to search for past  
broadcasts, and then the ability to watch, archive, download, and 
email such clips—in exchange for a $500 monthly fee.94 However, 
TVEyes did not license the programming it recorded from the  
broadcasters themselves; instead, it chose to rely on the fair use  
exception “as the foundation for its entire business.”95 This fact  
propelled the plaintiff, Fox News Network, LLC, to sue for  
copyright infringement.96 
The district court held that some of TVEyes’ features constituted 
fair use, such as those which enabled TVEyes subscribers to  
“archive” clips to a subscriber’s Media Center on the company’s 
server.97 However, the court also held that several of its services did 
not constitute fair use, such as those which allowed users to  
download video clips to one’s own computer, or to “search for and 
 
90 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., FAIR USE INDEX, AUTHORS GUILD, INC. V. GOOGLE INC. 
SUMMARY (2015), https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/summaries/authorsguild-google-
2dcir2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MRM-ZVRW]; see also Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 222. 
91 Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 229. 
92 See generally Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2018). 
93 Id. at 169. 
94 Id. at 175. 
95 Rachel Kim, Exploring the Bounds of Fair Use: Fox News v. TVEyes, COPYRIGHT 
ALLIANCE (Feb. 28, 2018), https://copyrightalliance.org/ca_post/fair-use-fox-news-v-
tveyes/ [https://perma.cc/4A48-QMRC]. 
96 Fox News Network, 883 F.3d at 174. 
97 Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., No. 13–5315, 2015 WL 8148831, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2015). 
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view television content by the date, time, and channel on which a 
program aired.”98 Therefore, the court awarded Fox an injunction 
with respect to the TVEyes functions that were found to not be fair 
use, but allowed the company’s functions that were otherwise con-
sidered fair use to continue.99 
On review, the Second Circuit conducted the four-step statutory 
analysis to consider whether TVEyes’ “Watch function” (which  
“allows TVEyes clients to view up to ten-minute, unaltered video 
clips of copyrighted content”100) constituted fair use. Ultimately, the 
appellate court held that it was not a fair use. Notably, even though 
the court decided that the “Watch function” had a “modest trans-
formative character” in its analysis of the first statutory factor,  
it ultimately weighed against its own finding of transformativeness 
and concluded that the fourth statutory factor was the most  
important.101 In observing the fourth factor (the effect on the poten-
tial market), the court first noted that TVEyes’ operations inherently 
demonstrated that “deep-pocketed consumers are willing to pay 
well” for such a media-viewing service, “and that this market is 
worth millions of dollars in the aggregate.”102 The court therefore 
concluded that because the media-monitoring market existed, 
TVEyes was effectively displacing potential revenues for Fox.103 
Given this displacement of revenue and TVEyes’ failure to properly 
license content from Fox, the court held that TVEyes had “usurp[ed] 
a market that properly belongs to the copyright-holder.”104 In the 
end, it decided that the fourth factor favored Fox, and that altogether, 
fair use did not exist in this case.105 The TVEyes case is significant 
in that it marked a moment where the Second Circuit returned to the 
past in its fair use analysis. Rather than finding fair use simply  




100 Fox News Network, 883 F.3d at 176. 
101 Id. at 178–79. 
102 Id. at 180. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. (quoting Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
105 Id. at 181. 
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returned to the prior notion that the fourth factor of fair use analysis 
is the “most important.”106 
This brings us to today: a time when courts, judges, and legal 
scholars alike continue to reconcile what exactly fair use means, and 
what it ought to mean. And for some practitioners, this is particu-
larly problematic: one critic of the ever-evolving nature of contem-
porary fair use analysis argues that “we have strayed far afield from 
the doctrine’s genesis,”107 and now, it is an “increasingly muddy 
morass.”108 Although the first statutory factor has demonstrably 
gained significance in fair use jurisprudence over the past two-and-
a-half decades, there is yet to be a bright-line rule that transforma-
tiveness—whatever “transformativeness” truly means—necessarily 
equals fair use.109 Moreover, as the TVEyes case suggests, the fourth 
factor is still regarded by some judges as the most important  
factor.110 This leaves a lingering question still unanswered: which 
fair use factor is analytically most important? 
 
II.  “REVIEWING THE SITUATION”111: A SURVEY OF FAIR USE 
LITIGATION INVOLVING THEATRICAL WORKS 
As Part I has detailed, fair use is difficult to define in the broad 
scope of contemporary American copyright law. Its analysis is not 
only highly fact-specific, but also court- and judge-specific, simply 
because no single factor is dispositive. Despite this, most fair use 
decisions have regarded the first or the fourth factor to be more  
important than others.112 To add to this messiness, courts that have 
 
106 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). 
107 Scott Alan Burroughs, The Tyranny of Fair Use: How a Once-Humble Copyright 
Doctrine Tormented a Generation of Litigants, ABOVE L. (Feb. 20, 2019), 
https://abovethelaw.com/2019/02/the-tyranny-of-fair-use-how-a-once-humble-copyright-
doctrine-tormented-a-generation-of-litigants/ [https://perma.cc/JE3D-QSYQ]. 
108 Scott Alan Burroughs, The Tyranny of Fair Use (Part III): A Judge’s Critique, 
Explosive Data, and One Sad Saga, ABOVE L. (Mar. 6, 2019), https://abovethelaw.com/
2019/03/the-tyranny-of-fair-use-part-iii-a-judges-critique-explosive-data-and-one-sad-
saga/ [https://perma.cc/7F3N-YPY7]. 
109 See infra Part II.B.3, which examines the hazy definition of “transformativeness.” 
110 Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2018). 
111 The title of a song from the 1960 musical Oliver! 
112 Richard Stim, Fair Use: The Four Factors Courts Consider in a Copyright 
Infringement Case, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/fair-use-the-four-
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veered toward emphasizing the first factor have an added analytical 
layer of a significant piece of case law: the Supreme Court’s  
Campbell opinion in 1994, which catalyzed the advent of the  
transformative use inquiry in fair use analysis.113 Fair use is thus a 
highly dynamic and ever-changing area of U.S. copyright law. 
In Part II.A, this Note will turn to an examination of fair use 
cases in an industry about which there exists limited academic  
literature: theatre. By focusing on fair use developments in this  
specific area, this Note seeks to refine scholarly understanding of 
the doctrine and its evolution. Part II.A surveys cases from 1981 to 
2018 that involve a fair use analysis and which center around a stage 
play or musical. Afterwards, in Part II.B, the Note takes a step back 
to observe the broader trends in fair use jurisprudence that the II.A 
cases collectively illustrate and to more prescriptively analyze  
such trends. 
A. The Theatre Cases: From “Boogie Woogie” (1981) to Cindy 
Lou Who (2018) 
Prior to Campbell in 1994, copyright infringement suits against 
theatre professionals were less likely to result in a finding of fair use 
in favor of the defendant. For example, the 1981 Second Circuit case 
of MCA, Inc. v. Wilson looked at Let My People Come, a cabaret 
show produced by the defendants which ran off-Broadway from 
January 1974 to July 1976.114 The show—which was “doing  
sell-out business”115 in the first year of its run—advertised itself as 
a “sexual musical,”116 and a New York Times critic described the 
 
factors.html [https://perma.cc/79KK-39Y8] (stating that “courts often focus on the first and 
fourth factors, considering the nature of the infringement and the effect on the copyright 
holder’s market”). 
113 Pamela Samuelson, Possible Futures of Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 815, 818 (2015). 
114 MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 181 (2d Cir. 1981). 
115 Mei. Gussow, Stage More Success Than Just Blurbs, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 1974), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1974/05/07/archives/stage-more-success-than-just-blurbs-let-
my-people-come-a-sexual.html [https://perma.cc/SF8W-S7X5]. 
116 John Corry, Broadway, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 1976), https://www.nytimes.com/1976/ 
07/02/archives/broadway-billy-dee-williams-will-play-dr-king-in-i-have-a-dream.html 
[https://perma.cc/3WGE-HR58]. 
2020] ANYTHING YOU CAN USE, I CAN USE BETTER 893 
 
music as sounding “like something we’ve heard before but defi-
nitely not with these words.”117 Plaintiff, the music publisher  
MCA, Inc. (“MCA”), argued that in Let My People Come, one  
musical number, titled “Cunnilingus Champion of Company C” 
(“‘Champion’”), infringed on its copyrighted song, “Boogie Woogie 
Bugle Boy” (“‘Bugle Boy’”).118 “Champion”—which sounded so 
alike to “Bugle Boy” that cast members of Let My People Come 
“told [defendant Wilson] that they thought it was similar”119— 
borrowed from the original tune musically, but substituted different, 
“dirty”120 lyrics. 
At trial, Wilson stated that “Champion” was not conceived to be 
a parody of “Bugle Boy” specifically, but rather, that the creators of 
the cabaret intended the song to “be a burlesque of the music of the 
1940s.”121 He testified that they borrowed from “Bugle Boy”  
because it was “immediately identifiable as something happy and 
joyous and it brought back a certain period in our history when we 
felt that way.”122 Contending that the use of MCA’s copyrighted 
song was done reasonably and that therefore, they were not required 
to secure MCA’s consent, Wilson asserted the defense of fair use.123 
The district court disagreed with Wilson, and the Second Circuit 
affirmed.124 The Second Circuit held that the use was not a fair use, 
and stated that if it held otherwise, the court would be extending “an 
open-ended invitation to musical plagiarism.”125 The court referred 
to the four factors of fair use found in 17 U.S.C. § 107 as “guide-
posts,” not relying on one factor more than another, before  
ultimately deciding that “Champion” did not constitute a sufficient 
 
117 See Gussow, supra note 115. 
118 “Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy” is a song originally performed by The Andrews Sisters 
during the World War II era. Bette Midler further popularized the song during her 1972 
pop recording. See Stephen Holden, POP VIEW; Wartime Dreams Revisited, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jul. 23, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/23/arts/pop-view-wartime-dreams-
revisited.html [https://perma.cc/297D-EBNW]. 
119 MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 184 (2d Cir. 1981). 
120 Id. at 185. 
121 Id. at 184. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 182. 
124 Id. at 185. 
125 MCA, 677 F.2d at 185.  
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parody or burlesque of “Bugle Boy,” and therefore, was not a fair 
use.126 Instead, in copying “Bugle Boy,” the court asserted that the 
composers’ purpose was “simply to reap the advantages of a  
well-known tune and short-cut the rigors of composing original  
music.”127 Notably, the Second Circuit remarked that it was “not 
prepared to hold that a commercial composer can plagiarize a  
competitor’s copyrighted song, substitute dirty lyrics of his own, 
perform it for commercial gain, and then escape liability by calling 
the end result a parody or satire on the mores of society.”128 
In his dissent, Circuit Judge Walter R. Mansfield disagreed and 
argued that the fair use doctrine as codified in the 1976 Copyright 
Act entitled defendants to protection.129 He asserted that defendants 
used only enough of MCA’s song “to conjure up a recollection of 
that image and thereby make possible a parody with a completely 
new, mocking, satirical turn to it.”130 He added, too, that there  
was no evidence that MCA sustained any damage as a result  
of the parody.131 
The Second Circuit’s MCA opinion came thirteen years before 
the Supreme Court’s 1994 ruling in Campbell, which expanded the 
scope of fair use analysis to include that of transformative use.132 
The first major fair use case centering around a musical that found 
in favor of defendants following a transformative use inquiry was 
SOFA Entertainment, Inc. v. Dodger Productions, Inc. in 2013.133 
In this case, defendants were producers of the Tony-winning  
musical Jersey Boys, which opened on Broadway in 2005 and  
 
126 Id. at 183. 
127 Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 439 n.5 (9th Cir. 1986) (referring to MCA in a footnote 
as an example of a Second Circuit case in which the court held the doctrine of fair use as 
inapplicable). 
128 MCA, Inc., 677 F.2d at 185. 
129 Id. at 188. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (as examined in Part I, in 
Campbell, Justice Souter argued that the central purpose of fair use analysis is to see 
whether the new work “adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, 
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether 
and to what extent the new work is ‘transformative’”). 
133 See generally SOFA Entm’t, Inc. v. Dodger Prods., Inc., 709 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 
2013). 
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dramatized the story of the musical group Frankie Valli and the Four 
Seasons. Toward the end of Act I of Jersey Boys, the character Bob 
Gaudio—one of the four founding members of the Four Seasons—
addresses the audience while the other three members of the band 
can be seen on a CBS studio stage preparing for a performance on 
“The Ed Sullivan Show” during the early 1960s.134 As Gaudio  
finishes speaking, a screen hanging over the stage shows a seven-
second clip of Ed Sullivan introducing the Four Seasons on his 
show, before the live actors and band perform the song “Dawn.”135 
Capping off the first act of Jersey Boys with the band’s appearance 
on Sullivan’s show was meant to demonstrate the Four Seasons’ rise 
in popularity. 
SOFA owned the copyright for the entire run of “The Ed  
Sullivan Show,” a television series which ran from 1948 to 1971.136 
SOFA’s founder, Andrew Solt, attended a performance of Jersey 
Boys, saw that the clip appeared in the show, determined that Dodger 
used the clip without permission or a license, and in 2008, filed a 
complaint against Dodger alleging copyright infringement.137 In 
2009, Dodger filed a summary judgment motion, asserting that its 
use of the seven-second clip constituted fair use, and the district 
court agreed.138 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the 
use of the clip was transformative and thus constituted fair use.139 
The court applied the four statutory factors of fair use, and argued 
that all four weighed in favor of defendants.140 First, looking to the 
purpose and character of the use, the court agreed with the  
defendants that they used the clip as a “biographical anchor” in the 
context of the show to demonstrate the swelling success of the Four 
Seasons, sufficiently “put[ting] the clip to its own transformative 
 
134 Id. at 1276–77. 
135 Id. at 1277. 
136 Id. at 1276. 
137 See Demand for Jury Trial, SOFA Entm’t, Inc. v. Dodger Prods., Inc., No. 208–02616, 
2008 WL 2072033 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2008). 
138 See SOFA Entm’t, Inc. v. Dodger Prods., Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d 898 (C.D. Cal. 2010), 
aff’d, 709 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 2013). 
139 See SOFA Entm’t, 709 F.3d at 1278. 
140 Id. 
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ends,” and thus favored Dodger on that factor.141 Second, with  
regard to the nature of the copyrighted work, the court concluded 
that the clip “conveys mainly factual information,” rather than any 
form of creative or fictional work, thus favoring Dodger.142 Third, 
in observing the amount and substantiality of the portion used, the 
court found that a seven-second clip was “hardly qualitatively  
significant,” again favoring Dodger.143 Fourth and finally, when 
considering the market effect of the use, the court decided that the 
use of the clip in Jersey Boys “advances its own original creation 
without any reasonable threat” to the market for “The Ed Sullivan 
Show.”144 Moreover, the court wrote that Jersey Boys is “not a  
substitute” for “The Ed Sullivan Show,” and that the former is not 
reproduced on videotape or DVD, which “would allow for repeated 
viewing of the clip.”145 All four factors of fair use analysis favored 
Dodger, and the court wrote that this case was “a good example of 
why the fair use doctrine exists.”146 
Two years after SOFA was decided, the Southern District of 
New York granted declaratory judgment in Adjmi v. DLT Entertain-
ment, Ltd. to a playwright following another finding of fair use.147 
Plaintiff David Adjmi penned 3C, a play based on the popular  
1970s television series “Three’s Company.”148 3C, which ran off-
Broadway in 2012, copied the premise, characters, sets, and scenes 
from the TV show, but turned it into “a nightmarish version of itself, 
using the familiar ‘Three’s Company’ construct as a vehicle to  
criticize and comment on the original’s light-hearted, sometimes  
superficial, treatment of certain topics and phenomena.”149 Shortly 
after the show opened, DLT—the copyright holder of “Three’s 
Company”—sent a cease and desist letter, asserting that 3C in-
fringed on DLT’s copyright in “Three’s Company” and demanding 
 
141 Id. at 1278–79. 
142 Id. at 1279. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 1280. 
145 SOFA Entm’t, 709 F.3d at 1280. 
146 Id. 
147 See Adjmi v. DLT Entm’t Ltd., 97 F. Supp. 3d 512, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
148 See id. 
149 Id. at 531. 
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that performances cease.150 The question for the court was whether 
3C sufficiently constituted a fair use of “Three’s Company.”151 
The court—which concluded that “there can be no set of facts to 
support an action for copyright infringement by DLT against 
Adjmi”—focused its fair use analysis heavily on the first factor: the 
purpose and character of the use.152 The court concluded that 3C 
constituted the type of parody that the Supreme Court sought to  
protect in Campbell in 1994.153 Borrowing language from Campbell, 
the court stated that it is “well recognized that ‘[p]arody needs to 
mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use 
the creation of its victim’s . . . imagination,’” and so, because “the 
‘purpose and character’ analysis assumes that the alleged parody 
will take from the original[,] the pertinent inquiry is how the alleged 
parody uses that original material.”154 The court concluded that 3C 
was “hardly a ‘repeat’” of “Three’s Company,” and that it was  
instead a “deconstruction” of the show.155 Whereas “Three’s  
Company” has become widely known for its nature as a “happy, 
light-hearted, run-of-the-mill, sometimes almost slapstick situation 
comedy,”156 3C, in contrast, “proceeds in a frenetic, disjointed, and 
sometimes philosophical tone . . . often difficult to follow and unre-
lentingly vulgar.”157 The court further determined that 3C used the 
“raw material of ‘Three’s Company’ ‘in the creation of new infor-
mation, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings’”— 
precisely the type of benefit to society that the fair use doctrine 
works to protect.158 
When looking to the second and third factors of fair use (the  
nature of the copyrighted work and the amount and substantiality of 
the portion used), the court acknowledged that both weighed  
 
150 See id. at 515. 
151 See id. at 528. 
152 Id. at 526. 
153 See Adjmi, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 530. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 531. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 532. 
158 Id. at 531 (citing Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 
141 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 1105, 1105 (1990)) (quotations omitted). 
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“somewhat against a finding of fair use,” but that it nevertheless did 
“little to sway the overall determination.”159 After looking to the 
fourth factor and determining that 3C is “not a potential market  
substitution” for “Three’s Company” and that the parodic piece of 
theatre posed no harm to the television show, the court ultimately 
awarded declaratory judgment for the playwright.160 The 3C case is 
noteworthy for the specific emphasis placed by the court on the first 
and fourth factors of fair use analysis. 
Also in 2015, the Second Circuit defined the scope of copyright 
protection in light of fair use in the case of Keeling v. Hars.161 At 
issue in this case was the script of Point Break Live!, a stage play 
parodying the 1991 film “Point Break,” which starred Keanu Reeves 
and Patrick Swayze.162 The play “added jokes, props, exaggerated 
staging, and humorous theatrical devices to transform the dramatic 
plot and dialogue of the film into an irreverent, interactive theatrical 
experience.”163 The playwright, Jaime Keeling, did not obtain  
authorization or a license from the film’s copyright holders.164 In 
2007, Keeling executed a production agreement with Eve Hars, the 
owner of a production company, to stage a two-month run of Point 
Break Live! later that year.165 During the run of the show, Hars 
“came to believe” that Keeling did not lawfully own the rights to the 
parody play.166 After the two-month run, Hars sought to renegotiate 
the terms of the contract and, “in effect, continue to produce [the 
play] without further payment to Keeling.”167 Keeling refused  
negotiation and registered a copyright in the play, which became  
effective in January 2008.168 Hars continued to stage performances 
of the play for four years thereafter “without payment to or authori-
zation from Keeling.”169 
 
159 Adjmi, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 532. 
160 Id. at 535. 
161 See generally Keeling v. Hars, 809 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2015). 
162 See id. at 45. 
163 Id. 
164 See id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Keeling, 809 F.3d at 45. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
2020] ANYTHING YOU CAN USE, I CAN USE BETTER 899 
 
Keeling brought suit against Hars, who asserted a counterclaim 
seeking a declaration that Keeling’s copyright registration was  
invalid.170 The district court ruled in 2010 that a parody that fairly 
uses previously copyrighted material may contain “sufficient  
originality to merit copyright protection itself.”171 On appeal, Hars 
argued that an unauthorized derivative work like Keeling’s play was 
not entitled to independent copyright protection, “regardless of 
whether it makes fair use of its source material.”172 The Second  
Circuit recognized the “unusual” posture of this argument: 
Typically, fair use is invoked as a defense against  
a claim of copyright infringement brought by  
the source-material rightsholder. Here, however,  
Keeling invoked the fair-use principle to establish  
an affirmative claim against defendants for unauthor-
ized use of her . . . parody. Hars concedes that Keel-
ing could use the “fair use” doctrine as a “shield” 
against a claim of copyright infringement[] but  
argues that she may not use the doctrine as a “sword” 
to vest a work with independent copyright protection 
against third-party infringement.173 
The Second Circuit found Hars’ argument to be inconsistent with 
the Copyright Act, which specifically cautions that protection “does 
not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been 
used unlawfully.”174 The Court engaged in a close reading of the 
statute to hold that if “a work employs preexisting copyrighted  
material lawfully—as in the case of a ‘fair use’—nothing in the  
statute prohibits the extension of the ‘independent’ copyright  
protection.”175 The court’s decision ultimately strengthened copy-
right protection for creators of derivative works who use preexisting 
material without authorization so long as the creator’s product is 
sufficiently original and constitutes a fair use. 
 
170 See id. at 46. 
171 Keeling v. New Rock Theater Prods., LLC, No. 10–9345, 2011 WL 6202796, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2011). 
172 Keeling, 809 F.3d at 49. 
173 Id. 
174 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2018); see also Keeling, 809 F.3d at 49. 
175 Keeling, 809 F.3d at 49. 
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One notable decision that serves as an exception to the growing 
trend of courts asserting the strength of fair use came via the Second 
Circuit in 2016 in the case of TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum.176 
In 2015, the play Hand to God opened on Broadway.177 In the first 
act of Hand to God, written by Robert Askins, the main character, 
Jason, performs “Who’s on First?”—the signature routine of the 
early-to-mid-1900s comedy duo Abbott and Costello—along with 
his sock puppet, Tyrone, to try to impress his crush.178 The routine 
is performed “verbatim” in the play for over a minute.179 In June 
2015, the plaintiffs, successors-in-interest to the estates of Abbott 
and Costello, filed an action against the defendants, asserting copy-
right infringement.180 The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing, 
threefold, that “(1) plaintiffs did not hold a valid copyright; (2) the 
[r]outine was in the public domain; and (3) [the play]’s incorpora-
tion of the [r]outine was sufficiently transformative to qualify as  
a permissible fair use.”181 The district court granted defendants’  
motion to dismiss specifically on fair use grounds.182 On appeal, the 
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to grant the  
motion to dismiss, but on substantially different grounds: the Second 
Circuit actually found that the facts collectively weighed against a 
finding of fair use, and that the defendants were only entitled to a 
victory because the heirs failed to assert a valid copyright interest in 
the “Who’s on First?” routine.183 
The Second Circuit held that all four statutory factors weighed 
against a finding of fair use. First, looking to the purpose and  
character of the use, the Second Circuit disagreed with the district 
 
176 839 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir. 2016). 
177 Michael Paulson, Robert Askins Brings ‘Hand to God’ to Broadway, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/05/theater/robert-askins-brings-hand-to-god-
to-broadway.html [https://perma.cc/HR8P-P2BP]. 
178 See TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum, 839 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir. 2016). 
179 Id. 
180 Andrew R. Chow, ‘Hand to God’ Play Sued by Abbott and Costello Heirs Over Use 
of ‘Who’s on First?’, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/05/
theater/hand-to-god-play-sued-by-abbott-and-costello-heirs-over-use-of-whos-on-
first.html [https://perma.cc/KT5N-399E]. 
181 Id. at 177. 
182 TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum, 151 F. Supp. 3d 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d on 
other grounds, 839 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2016). 
183 See TCA Television Corp., 839 F.3d at 192. 
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court that the defendant’s use was transformative in nature.184 The 
Second Circuit specified that its inquiry centered on whether the 
new work used the copyrighted material “for a purpose, or imbues 
it with a character, different from that for which it was created,”185 
and concluded that Hand to God’s use of the routine did not demon-
strate such a transformative use.186 Second, in analyzing the nature 
of the copyrighted work, the court found that “Who’s on First?,” as 
“an original comedy sketch created for public entertainment,” was 
of a creative nature, thus weighing against a finding of fair use.187 
Third, in regard to the amount and substantiality of the portion used, 
the court decided that the use of the routine in the show was “sub-
stantial copying.”188 Fourth and finally, concerning the market effect 
of the use, the court decided that the defendants’ use of the routine 
could “adversely affect” the licensing market for the work.189  
Three years following the Second Circuit’s expansive definition of 
transformative use in Cariou, TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum 
represented a boundary line for the court, and signified that it was 
unwilling to deem every “different” use a transformative one.190 
While many fair use cases involving theatrical properties have 
turned on the significant first factor of fair use analysis and an  
inquiry into the transformative nature of the work, the 2017 case of 
Corbello v. DeVito—another case involving parties to the musical 
Jersey Boys—in the District Court for the District of Nevada  
represents an example of a court emphasizing the fourth factor as 
most important.191 Plaintiff Donna Corbello was the widow and heir 
of Rex Woodward, who, in 1988, agreed to write the authorized  
biography of Tommy DeVito, one of the original members of The 
Four Seasons.192 Woodward and DeVito decided they would be  
considered co-authors and would share equally in any profits arising 
 
184 See id. at 183. 
185 Id. at 180. 
186 See id. at 192. 
187 Id. at 184. 
188 Id. at 185. 
189 TCA Television Corp., 839 F.3d at 186. 
190 Id. at 180. 
191 262 F. Supp. 3d 1056 (D. Nev. 2017). 
192 See Corbello v. DeVito, 777 F.3d 1058, 1060 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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from the book.193 By 1991, the biography neared completion, but 
that year, Woodward died.194 Shortly before Woodward’s death,  
DeVito registered the manuscript for the biography with the U.S. 
Copyright Office “in his own name.”195 Eight years later, in 1999, 
DeVito entered into an agreement to transfer his right to adapt the 
biography “for the purpose of creating a musical,” which eventually 
turned into Jersey Boys.196 
After Jersey Boys won the 2006 Tony Award for Best Musical, 
Corbello “surmised that there might be more interest in a book about 
the Four Seasons.”197 She “hired some lawyers to handle the  
copyright matters, and was surprised to learn that Woodward did not 
own a copyright in the book.”198 In 2007, she filed a supplementary 
application to add Woodward as a co-author and co-claimant of the 
biography, which was accepted and certified by the U.S. Copyright 
Office in 2009. Thereafter, plaintiff sued DeVito for an accounting 
of her share of the profits derived from the biography that had  
“inspired the form, structure, and content” of Jersey Boys.199 In 
2016, after extensive motion practice, a Ninth Circuit appeal, and 
eventual remand, a federal jury returned a verdict in plaintiff’s  
favor.200 However, in a post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter 
of law, defendants sought to set that verdict aside.201 
In 2017, the district court agreed, and reversed the jury’s verdict 
by finding that all four factors of analysis supported a finding of fair 
use.202 In the process, the court called the fourth factor of analysis 
“the most important.”203 In observing the effect of the musical on 
 
193 See Corbello v. DeVito, 832 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1233 (D. Nev. 2011). 
194 See id. at 1234. 
195 Corbello, 777 F.3d at 1061. 
196 Corbello v. DeVito, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1063 (D. Nev. 2017). 
197 Marc Hershberg, Creators Of ‘Jersey Boys’ Found Guilty of Copyright Infringement, 




199 Corbello, 262 F. Supp. 3d at 1062. 
200 See Hershberg, supra note 197. 
201 See Corbello, 262 F. Supp. 3d at 1068. 
202 See id. at 1077. 
203 Id. at 1068. 
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the market for the copyrighted biography, the court decided that  
before Jersey Boys opened, the book “had no market value,”  
demonstrated by the fact that Woodward and DeVito had trouble 
striking a deal with a publishing company, and “because interest in 
the Four Seasons was not great enough to make sales of the  
[biography] profitable.”204 The court further argued that the  
profitability of the biography today would be “almost certainly only 
because of [Jersey Boys].”205 Corbello thus serves as an example  
of a court emphasizing the fourth factor as most important in its fair 
use analysis. 
Most recently, in 2018, the Second Circuit—an especially cru-
cial court, due to the location of Broadway in New York City— 
affirmed a district court’s ruling in Lombardo v. Dr. Seuss Enter-
prises, L.P., and again reiterated the broad nature of transformative 
use and the strength of bona fide parodies against infringement 
claims.206 Plaintiff Matthew Lombardo authored Who’s Holiday!, a  
comedic stage play which borrows the “character, plot, and  
setting”207 as well as the “rhyming couplet”208 writing structure of 
the 1957 Dr. Seuss book, “How the Grinch Stole Christmas!,” 
though the play included themes far more adult and provocative than 
those in the source material.209 In July 2016, a few months before 
the play’s scheduled off-Broadway premiere, defendant sent  
 
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 1069. 
206 Elizabeth Altman & Scott J. Sholder, Lombardo v. Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P.: 
Parody Hasn’t Outgrown Fair Use, COWAN, DEBAETS, ABRAHAMS & SHEPPARD LLP L. 
BLOG (Jul. 27, 2018), https://cdas.com/drseuss-fair-use/ [https://perma.cc/ F7NJ-B5RM]. 
207 Lombardo v. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P., 279 F. Supp. 3d 497, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff’d, 
729 F. App’x 131 (2d Cir. 2018). 
208 Id. at 503. 
209 See id. (stating that in Who’s Holiday!, Cindy Lou Who “drinks hard alcohol, abuses 
prescription pills, and smokes a substance she identifies as ‘Who Hash’”); see also Jennifer 
Simard Will Play a Grown-Up Cindy Lou Who in Who’s Holiday Off-Broadway, 
BROADWAY.COM (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.broadway.com/buzz/186115/jennifer-
simard-will-play-a-grown-up-cindy-lou-who-in-whos-holiday-off-broadway/ 
[https://perma.cc/C328-8RN3] (reporting that Who’s Holiday! “follows a middle-aged 
Cindy Lou Who as she prepares for a Christmas Eve party in her trailer on Mount 
Crumpit”). 
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plaintiffs cease and desist letters.210 Plaintiffs called off the forth-
coming run of the show and filed suit seeking a declaration that the 
play constituted fair use.211 The district court held that Lombardo’s 
play was a parody, and thus qualified as fair use.212 
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the 
play was fair use.213 First, in looking at the purpose and character of 
the use, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court’s determi-
nation that Who’s Holiday! is a parody, “recontextualiz[ing] 
Grinch’s easily-recognizable [sic] plot and rhyming style by placing 
Cindy–Lou Who—a symbol of childhood innocence and naiveté—
in outlandish, profanity-laden, adult-themed scenarios involving 
topics such as poverty, teen-age pregnancy, drug and alcohol abuse, 
prison culture, and murder.”214 Second, with regard to the nature of 
the copyrighted work, the district court glossed over this considera-
tion, a decision which the Second Circuit considered proper for  
analysis of a parody: “The second factor is rarely useful ‘in sepa-
rating the fair use sheep from the infringing goats in a parody case, 
since parodies almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive 
works.’”215 Third, the Second Circuit decided that in terms of the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used, the original Grinch 
material was used in a manner which serviced the parody simply by 
invoking the original work, rather than verbatim copying or quot-
ing.216 Fourth and finally, when considering the market effect of the 
use, the court agreed that because Who’s Holiday! was a “parody 
pure and simple,” there was little likelihood of harm for either the 
consumer or licensing markets for Grinch.217 The Lombardo case, 
thus, strengthened the fair use protection of parodies. 
 
210 See Lombardo, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 504. 
211 See id. at 504. 
212 See id. at 502. 
213 See Lombardo v. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P., 729 F. App’x 131, 133 (2d Cir. 2018). 
214 Lombardo, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 508. 
215 Lombardo, 729 F. App’x at 133 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 
U.S. 569, 586 (1994)). 
216 Id. 
217 Lombardo, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 512. 
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B. Life Imitates Art: Using the Theatre Cases to Understand Fair 
Use Today 
The aforementioned cases—each of which relate to or center on 
a stage play or musical—collectively serve as a microcosm of 
broader fair use trends to offer three main findings in how courts 
engage in fair use analysis today, discussed further in this Part II.B. 
First, fair use is a “choose-your-own-adventure” jumble of legal 
analysis. Second, the definition of “parody” is arguably ambiguous. 
Third, and finally: (1) the transformative use inquiry is now  
employed almost universally in contemporary fair use analyses; (2) 
the inquiry generally benefits parties accused of copyright infringe-
ment; but (3) “transformative” is an elusive term that ultimately  
undermines the importance of 17 U.S.C. § 107 as the central statute 
that articulates the factors for fair use analysis. Following an  
examination of these three trends, this Part II.B concludes with the 
argument that judges engaging in future fair use discussions ought 
to forsake the transformative use inquiry. 
1. Fair Use Remains a Hodgepodge of Legal Analysis 
First, the theatre cases indicate that fair use—nearly two centu-
ries after Folsom and a quarter of a century after Campbell— 
remains a hodgepodge of legal analysis: “a checklist of things to be 
considered rather than a formula for decisions.”218 In the theatre 
cases alone, the balancing mechanisms by which judges weighed the 
four factors of fair use analysis varied widely. In SOFA Entertain-
ment, the Ninth Circuit balanced all four factors rather evenly  
and equally before weighing in favor of Dodger and concluding that 
“society’s enjoyment of Dodger’s creative endeavor [was]  
enhanced” with the inclusion of the Ed Sullivan clip in Jersey 
Boys.219 In Adjmi, the Southern District of New York focused its 
analysis considerably on the first and fourth factors, outright admit-
ting that the second and third factors were of “lesser importance.”220 
In Corbello, the District Court for the District of Nevada decided 
 
218 Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 522 (7th Cir. 2002). 
219 SOFA Entm’t, Inc. v. Dodger Prods., Inc., 709 F.3d 1273, 1280 (9th Cir. 2013). 
220 Adjmi v. DLT Entm’t Ltd., 97 F. Supp. 3d 512, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
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that the fourth factor of analysis was the “most important.”221 By 
contrast, in Lombardo, the Southern District of New York empha-
sized the dispositive determination of the first factor: “once a work 
is determined to be a parody, the second, third, and fourth factors 
are unlikely to militate against a finding of fair use.”222 
This varying range of analysis and jurisprudence is not limited 
to litigation involving theatrical stage plays and/or musicals. Return-
ing to the broader fair use cases listed in Part I.B, some cases, like 
Cariou, focused heavily on the first factor, affirming the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Campbell and emphasizing the profound 
strength of transformativeness in a finding of fair use.223 Other 
cases, such as TVEyes, echoed case law prior to Campbell— 
specifically, the 1985 case of Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.  
Nation Enterprises—to contend that the fourth factor is the most  
important.224 In fact, the cases that refer back to Harper & Row tend 
to echo the state of the law for the years between the passage of the 
1976 Copyright Act and Campbell in 1994, where the fourth factor 
was indeed “paramount in importance.”225 In the years following 
Campbell, despite the fact that courts continue to cite Harper &  
Row to restate the understanding that the fourth factor is most  
important,226 some ultimately pursue an analysis that centers chiefly 
around the importance of the transformative use inquiry instead.227 
At the end of the day, this puts the framework of fair use in a state 
that is particularly difficult to understand. 
When the Supreme Court decided in Campbell that the fair use 
defense was “not to be simplified with bright-line rules” but rather, 
to be examined through “case-by-case analysis,” it prescribed an  
 
221 Corbello v. DeVito, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1069 (D. Nev. 2017). 
222 Lombardo, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 507 (quoting Abilene Music, Inc. v. Sony Music 
Entm’t, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 84, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). 
223 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013) (referring to 17 U.S.C. § 107 
(2018)). 
224 Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 179 (2d Cir. 2018). 
225 See Burroughs, supra note 107. 
226 Fox News Network, 883 F.3d at 179. 
227 See Liu, supra note 64, at 198 (finding that in recent years, even though factor four 
continues to have a strong correlation with fair use outcome because of the Supreme 
Court’s claim in Harper & Row, it actually has a “slightly smaller effect than factor one” 
does). 
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inexact, subjective style of fair use analysis.228 This remains the case 
today. This constantly evolving, case-specific framework of  
analysis has troubled some scholars: 
A threshold issue . . . concerns the fuzziness of  
fair use. In particular, the fair use doctrine requires 
courts and users to engage in a complex multivariate 
analysis whose result is nearly impossible to predict.  
Compounding this problem is the fact that courts 
generally keep the doctrine as vague as possible and 
decline to provide a formula for what constitutes fair 
use. Given that courts use such an open-ended anal-
ysis, their failure to converge on a shared understand-
ing of what constitutes fair use is unsurprising.229 
Indeed, the lack of a consistent set of guidelines for approaching 
fair use analysis is arguably concerning, if not because of a lack of 
predictability for parties to a copyright infringement lawsuit, then at 
least because these guidelines are explicitly codified by statute.230 
After all, 17 U.S.C. § 107 serves as Congress’s articulation of the 
contours that should govern the courts’ fair use analyses. However, 
instead of strictly adhering to the statute’s language, many courts 
have subscribed to the influence of a single word from a 1990 law 
review article used in one Supreme Court opinion, and have rolled 
forward analyzing fair use through a “transformative” factor that 
was manufactured decades after the statute’s passage.231 The fact 
that so many courts are deciding fair use cases based on a criterion 
that did not even exist when the fair use statute was enacted by Con-
gress suggests a systemic statutory ignorance. Thus, case law since 
the statutory codification of fair use in 1976 has further complicated 
its analysis, which has become “amorphous . . . veer[ing] into the 
metaphysical and evanescent.”232 
 
228 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). 
229 See Parchamovsky & Weiser, supra note 65, at 92–93. 
230 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). 
231 See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. 569 (citing Judge Leval’s 1990 law review article 
in its then-novel emphasis of the now-important “transformative” factor in fair use 
analysis). 
232 See Burroughs, supra note 107. 
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2. Parody Is Art, Not Science 
Second, the theatre cases suggest that while 17 U.S.C. § 107 
helps to protect parodies that make fair use of copyrighted material, 
what sufficiently constitutes “parody” is also not entirely settled. To 
be sure, prior to Campbell, parody cases were decided on a subjec-
tive, sometimes even normative basis, such as in MCA, Inc. v.  
Wilson.233 When Campbell was decided, it imbued parody with  
sturdier legal grounds.234 However, the definition of “parody” set 
forth in Campbell was particularly imprecise: amorphously, the 
“joinder of reference and ridicule.”235 Although the Supreme Court 
generously bestowed parody with a rather broad definition under the 
parameters of fair use, the key question for courts thereafter  
remained: what constitutes an effective such “joinder?”236 
Certainly, in some cases, courts have found a stage play or  
musical to be an obvious parody. For example, the Second Circuit 
was quick to deem Point Break Live! a parody because it added  
to the “raw material” of the original 1991 film “jokes, props, exag-
gerated staging, and humorous theatrical devices to transform  
the dramatic plot and dialogue . . . into an irreverent, interactive  
theatrical experience.”237 Similarly, Who’s Holiday! sufficiently 
“subvert[ed] the expectations of the Seussian genre, and lam-
poon[ed] the Grinch” for the Second Circuit to characterize the play 
as a parody.238 However, in TCA Television Corp., neither the  
district court nor the Second Circuit seemed interested in engaging 
in a discussion of whether the play’s inclusion of “Who’s on First” 
constituted a parody; instead, the former court simply cited a  
previous case to contend that, “It is hardly parodic to repeat [the] 
same exercise . . . just because society and the characters have 
 
233 See Samuelson, supra note 113, at 824 (noting that courts “sometimes commented on 
bad taste or indecency when denying fair use defenses in parody cases”). 
234 Parody “‘has an obvious claim to transformative value,’ and thus deciding that the 
new work is a parody necessarily entails finding that the new work is transformative.” See 
Abilene Music, Inc. v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 84, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)). 
235 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583. 
236 Id.; see also Stacey Dogan & Mark Lemley, Parody as Brand, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
473, 474 (2013). 
237 Keeling v. Hars, 809 F.3d 43, 45 (2d Cir. 2015). 
238 Lombardo v. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P., 279 F. Supp. 3d 497, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
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aged.”239 To be sure, courts over the last four decades have granted 
theatrical creators and producers far more leeway in their ability to 
create and produce off-color parodies.240 But the question remains 
how obviously parodic a stage play needs to be for a court to deem 
it so.241 This ambiguity drives home, again, the jurisprudential  
problems created when courts and judges continue to emphasize  
the importance of “transformativeness” when transformativeness  
itself has little real meaning beyond one singular piece of aging  
case law.242 
3. The Transformative Use Inquiry Is Increasingly Popular, 
Beneficial to Defendants, and Yet Ever-Mystifying (and 
Should Be Abandoned) 
Third, and finally, the theatre cases illustrate three key points 
about the transformative use inquiry in contemporary fair use  
jurisprudence: (1) the transformative use inquiry has dramatically 
grown in fair use jurisprudence in recent years243; (2) more often 
than not, it has resulted in findings of fair use to the benefit of parties 
accused of copyright infringement244; and yet, puzzlingly, (3) the 
term “transformative” remains far from settled as a legal term of 
art.245 These three details—when operating in concert as they  
currently do—are rather troubling, and ought to demand greater  
attention from legal scholars and practitioners, as they altogether 
 
239 TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum, 151 F. Supp. 3d 419, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(citing Adjmi v. DLT Entm’t Ltd., 97 F. Supp. 3d 512, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)). 
240 See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 180 (2d Cir. 1981). 
241 Rachel Brooke, Theatrical Parody in an Age of Uncertain Fair Use in the Second 
Circuit, N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. BLOG (Apr. 4, 2018), https://blog.jipel.law.
nyu.edu/2018/04/theatrical-parody-in-an-age-of-uncertain-fair-use-in-the-second-circuit/ 
[https://perma.cc/34RP-NZ6T]. 
242 See infra Part II.B.3. 
243 See Moskowitz, supra note 64, at 1058 (noting “the increased use of transformative 
use as a fair use defense”). 
244 See Liu, supra note 64, at 163 (stating that “of all the dispositive decisions that upheld 
transformative use, 94% eventually led to a finding of fair use”); see also Netanel, supra 
note 16, at 715 (finding “a dramatic increase in defendant win rates on fair use that 
correlates with the courts’ embrace of the transformative use doctrine”). 
245 See Liu, supra note 64, at 163 (contending that courts “diverge widely on the meaning 
of transformative use”); Brian Sites, Fair Use and the New Transformative, 39 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 513, 515, 517 (2016) (highlighting the “malleable,” ever-evolving nature of 
the transformative use inquiry). 
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portend great uncertainty and vagueness in fair use jurisprudence. 
Indeed, studies show that the transformative use inquiry has been 
involved in as many as 90% of fair use decisions in recent years, 
“gradually approaching total dominance in fair use jurisprudence 
since Campbell.”246 Notably, all of the post-Campbell theatre cases 
examined in this Note engaged in a transformative use discussion. 
Further, this “judicial embrace”247 of transformative use has  
resulted in a “dramatic increase in defendant win rates on fair 
use.”248 Some scholars now note that transformative use by the  
defendant is “a robust predictor” of a finding of fair use.249  
According to a study published in 2019 by the Stanford Technology 
Law Review (and evidenced by the law review article’s chart,  
reproduced below), the share of transformative use decisions in fair 
use decisions has increased dramatically over the last two decades, 
when it jumped from 8% in 1994 (the year that Campbell was 
handed down by the Supreme Court) to 88% in 2016.250 
 
 
246 See Liu, supra note 64, at 166; see also Netanel, supra note 16, at 736 (“[W]e see that 
fair use doctrine today is overwhelmingly dominated by the Leval–Campbell 
transformative use doctrine.”). 
247 See Netanel, supra note 16, at 736. 
248 Id. at 715. 
249 Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 84 (2012). 
250 See Liu, supra note 64, at 174. 
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Figure 1: Transformative Use and Fair Use Cases Over Time251 
This trend of increasing transformative use decisions as a per-
centage of fair use decisions is illustrated further—albeit anecdo-
tally, but still, as examples—by the six theatre cases post-Campbell 
explored in this Note, in which all but one resulted in a finding of 
fair use. This jurisprudential trend has, no doubt, been a result of the 
Supreme Court’s assertion in Campbell that when looking at the first 
factor of fair use analysis, courts should investigate “whether the 
new work merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original . . . or 
instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different 
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or mes-
sage.”252 Cases that have followed, notably Cariou, have echoed the 
importance of the transformative use inquiry.253 According to the 
aforementioned Stanford study, influential fair use decisions led to 
 
251 See id. at 175. 
252 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (quoting Folsom v. 
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)); see also Netanel, supra note 16, at 719; 
Adjmi v. DLT Entm’t Ltd., 97 F. Supp. 3d 512, 529–30 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (referring to 
“purpose and character” inquiry identified in Campbell and acknowledging that courts 
“refer to this property by the shorthand ‘transformative’”). 
253 See Recent Case, Copyright Law, supra note 80, at 1228 (Cariou “relaxed the 
requirements for transformativeness such that a work need only show ‘new expression, 
meaning, or message’”). 
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immediate surges in transformative use decisions, such as Perfect 
10 in 2007 and the series of Google Books decisions that began 
emerging in 2012.254 
However, judges “diverge widely on the meaning of transform-
ative use,”255 and this divergence has had tangible jurisprudential 
consequences. The most glaring example of this was the Second  
Circuit’s broad decision in 2013 in Cariou that once a secondary 
work was found to be transformative, the other fair use factors were 
“mitigated.”256 Further, in Adjmi, the Southern District of New  
York concluded that 3C was “highly transformative” because the 
new play was such “a drastic departure from the original” television  
series, even though the situation and circumstances were  
unchanged.257 By contrast, in TCA Television Corp., the Second  
Circuit did not consider the use of a comedy routine—in a differing 
situation and circumstance from the original—to be sufficiently  
transformative.258 Even though the transformative use inquiry has 
increasingly been used in fair use litigation, and even though judges 
seem to side increasingly with parties accused of infringement on 
the demonstration of transformativeness, there still exists a wide ar-
ray of thought on what transformativeness even means. 
While the transformative use inquiry affords creative liberty to 
artists and creators in court, its existence as a non-statutory goalpost 
is jurisprudentially dangerous, has created unignorable judicial 
skepticism, and effectively lessens the importance of the actual fair 
use statute: 17 U.S.C. § 107.259 By deeming the singular issue of 
 
254 See Liu, supra note 64, at 174. 
255 See id. at 163; see also Moskowitz, supra note 64, at 1093 (pondering that allowing 
judges to determine what is transformative may fall outside what is actually “fair” for the 
creators of original works). 
256 See Samuelson, supra note 113, at 830. 
257 Adjmi, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 535. 
258 See TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum, 839 F.3d 168, 180 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[E]ven 
if the Play’s purpose and character are completely different from the vaudevillian humor 
originally animating ‘Who’s on First?,’ that, by itself, does not demonstrate that 
defendants’ use of the Routine in the Play was transformative of the original work.”). 
259 See Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014) (in which Judge 
Easterbrook expresses skepticism of the advancement of the transformative use inquiry 
after Cariou “because asking exclusively whether something is ‘transformative’ not only 
replaces the list in § 107 but also could override 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), which protects 
derivative works”). 
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what “transformative” means as essentially dispositive, judges over 
the last two decades have effectively rendered the other fair use  
factors—the ones that are actually specified in the Copyright Act—
“virtually worthless in favor of a fabricated factor.”260 Judges and 
legal scholars should be more distressed by this trend than they  
presently seem to be; after all, the proposal of the transformative use 
inquiry in Judge Leval’s influential 1990 article was not meant to 
exclusively prioritize the first factor, but rather, “to prove that  
transformative uses should be weighed according to the utilitarian 
value of the product created by the secondary user in relation to  
the other factors.”261 Although the wholesale elimination of  
the transformative use inquiry would be a radical change, doing  
so would offer parties in a copyright infringement suit significantly 
more clarity and transparency, and would encourage judges  
to adhere more closely to the language codified by Congress  
in 1976.262 
In 1841, Justice Story wrote that in regard to the possibility of a 
bright-line standard in fair use cases, it is “not . . . easy to arrive at 
any satisfactory conclusion, or to lay down any general principles 
applicable to all cases.”263 The boundaries of a fair use standard still 
await formal demarcation, and as a result, fair use analysis remains 
doctrinally ambiguous, and the balancing test of the four statutory 
factors inevitably ends up determined by the whim of the specific 
judge or court assessing the case.264 Further, in recent decades,  
prevailing normative values among the judiciary have shifted what 
may be appropriately considered a parody.265 And perhaps most  
 
260 See Burroughs, supra note 108. 
261 See Moskowitz, supra note 64, at 1085. 
262 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). 
263 See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
264 Fair Use, CLAREMONT C. LIBR., http://libraries.claremont.edu/achontutorial/ 
pages/achon_mod04pg06.html [https://perma.cc/9TU3-N7RK] (referring to fair use as a 
“relatively subjective determination”). 
265 Compare MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981) (in the year 1981, a 
court was “not prepared to hold that a commercial composer can . . . substitute dirty lyrics 
of his own, perform it for commercial gain, and then escape liability by calling the end 
result a parody”), with Lombardo v. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P., 279 F. Supp. 3d 497, 509 
(S.D.N.Y. 2017) (by 2018, courts praised such takes: “The Play’s coarseness and vulgarity 
lampoons Grinch by highlighting the ridiculousness of the utopian society depicted in the 
original work: society is not good and sweet, but coarse, vulgar and disappointing”). 
914          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXX:873 
 
critically, even though the transformative use inquiry has dominated 
and determined fair use jurisprudence since Campbell in 1994, 
courts still differ on how to determine sufficient transformative-
ness.266 Because fair use analysis remains entirely case-by-case  
and highly fact-specific, today there is “no formula” for a successful 
fair use defense.267 
 
III. “YOU’VE GOT TO BE CAREFULLY TAUGHT”268: CREATING 
THEATRE, BEST PRACTICES, AND AVOIDING RELIANCE ON FAIR USE 
While most of this Note has, thus far, been written with legal 
and academic audiences in mind, this final Part is offered primarily 
for the benefit of theatre artists, creators, and producers. The recom-
mendations that follow hereafter may seem intuitive to lawyers and 
legal scholars, but they have indeed been penned expressly as a 
roadmap for practitioners in the theatre industry, who, until now, 
lacked a quality source of guidance as to the permissibility of using 
previously copyrighted material in new theatrical works. 
Although Broadway is not the be-all and end-all destination for 
theatrical creators and producers in presenting their works before an 
audience, it arguably offers the highest chance for commercial  
visibility and, thus, positive financial prospects.269 For example, the 
2018–2019 Broadway season saw a total box office gross of $1.8 
billion.270 Ticket prices have soared over recent years, and so, too, 
 
266 See Liu, supra note 64, at 163. 
267 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., MORE INFORMATION ON FAIR USE, https://www.copyright.
gov/fair-use/more-info.html [https://perma.cc/X8K2-KT5K] [hereinafter MORE 
INFORMATION ON FAIR USE]. 
268 The title of a song from the 1949 musical South Pacific. 
269  “Broadway” refers to venues in the Theatre District near Times Square in Midtown 
Manhattan with 500 or more seats. Such theaters have been certified by The Broadway 
League, the trade association for the Broadway industry, and productions that open in one 
of the (currently) 41 Broadway houses are usually eligible for consideration for that 
season’s Tony Awards. See Ludovic Coutaud, The Difference Between Broadway, Off-
Broadway, and Off-Off Broadway, NYFA MUSICAL THEATRE STUDENT RESOURCES  
(Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.nyfa.edu/student-resources/difference-broadway-off-off-
broadway/ [https://perma.cc/L7RA-4E8N]. 
270 See Michael Paulson, Broadway’s Box Office Keeps Booming. Now Attendance Is 
Surging, Too., N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/29/ 
theater/broadway-box-office.html [https://perma.cc/SYE6-VV36]. 
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have record industry grosses.271 When a production secures a  
Broadway house (and thus, secures the opportunity to be considered 
for that season’s Tony Awards272), producers are incentivized to fill 
as many seats at as high a price point as feasible. This may illustrate 
why, of the eleven original musicals that opened during the 2018–
2019 Broadway season, seven were based on a previous film, book, 
or popular musical artist’s life story, and another was a separate  
jukebox musical.273 Commercial producers may anticipate  
that built-in fan bases for existing properties will generate ticket 
sales in turn.274 
 
271 See Michael Paulson, High Ticket Prices Are Fueling a Broadway Boom, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/theater/high-ticket-prices-are-
fueling-a-broadway-boom.html [https://perma.cc/A3AJ-M9SU]. 
272 See Rules and Regulations of the American Theatre Wing’s 73rd Annual Tony 
Awards—2018–2019 Season, TONY AWARDS, https://www.tonyawards.com/documents/4/
2019_Tony_Rules__Regulations.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C4W-JTDK] (listing, in Section  
I-2, certain requirements for the Tony Awards Administration Committee to determine that 
a production is eligible in the various categories for nomination for a Tony Award, such as 
officially opening in an eligible Broadway theatre). 
273 These seven musicals from the 2018–2019 Broadway season were: (1) Ain’t Too 
Proud (a jukebox musical based on the story of The Temptations), (2) Beetlejuice (based 
on the 1988 film of the same name), (3) Be More Chill (based on the 2004 novel of the 
same name), (4) The Cher Show (a jukebox musical based on the life story of Cher), (5) 
King Kong (based on the 1933 film of the same name), (6) Pretty Woman (based on the 
1990 film of the same name), and (7) Tootsie (based on the 1982 film of the same name). 
Head Over Heels was another jukebox musical from the season, though it was not a bio-
musical like that of Ain’t Too Proud or The Cher Show; rather, its score featured music 
exclusively from The Go-Go’s, set to a different story. See Ben Brantley, What’s Broadway 
Got to Do With It?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/04/ 
theater/broadway-pop-musicals.html [https://perma.cc/632J-P5R3] (contending that the 
2001 ABBA jukebox musical Mamma Mia! opened “the floodgates” to an ongoing trend 
of jukebox musicals on Broadway). 
274 Ken Davenport, Some Startling New Statistics on Broadway Musical Adaptations vs. 
Original Shows, PRODUCER’S PERSPECTIVE (May 1, 2014), https://www.theproducer
sperspective.com/my_weblog/2014/05/some-startling-new-statistics-on-broadway-
musical-adaptations-vs-original-shows.html [https://perma.cc/6EWV-78SW]; see also 
Peter Marks, As Tourist-Friendly Musicals Take Over, Broadway No Longer Belongs to 




916          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXX:873 
 
To be sure, the creation of an original musical or stage play quite 
commonly involves the borrowing of some previous idea.275 Many 
well-known Broadway shows are based off of books or poems.276 
Others have been inspired by previous stage productions.277 An  
increasing number of Broadway productions come directly from the 
screen, whether film or television.278 Given, then, the frequent basis 
with which new theatrical properties are inspired by previous works, 
it is unsurprising that many industry professionals are “cautious 
about utilizing pre-existing copyrighted materials in their new 
works.”279 
While this Note has, thus far, explored the history of fair use in 
American copyright law and examined the doctrine’s analysis in re-
cent litigation involving theatrical properties, this Part III now turns 
to an ultimate recommendation for theatre professionals: when writ-
ing, developing, or mounting a new production, theatre artists, cre-
ators, and producers should avoid any sort of reliance on the fair use 
doctrine. Despite several recent successes at trial for copyright  
infringement defendants in the theatre industry, fair use remains a 
mystifying and muddy defense.280 As this Note has established, fair 
 
275 Ken Davenport, 50 Years of Broadway Musical Source Material: A By the Numbers 
Infographic, PRODUCER’S PERSPECTIVE (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.theproducers
perspective.com/my_weblog/2015/11/50-years-of-broadway-musical-source-material-a-
by-the-numbers-infographic.html [https://perma.cc/9QNE-NKC8] (illustrating that 
between 1965 and 2014, only 24.3% of new Broadway musicals were truly original, rather 
than being based on a film, play, life story, etc.). 
276 Andrew Lloyd Webber’s 1981 musical Cats, for example, was inspired by T.S. Eliot’s 
1939 poetry book Old Possum’s Book of Practical Cats. See Kathryn Hughes, The Nine 
Lives of Cats: How Poetry Became a Musical, Then a Film . . . , GUARDIAN (Dec. 16, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/dec/16/nine-lives-ts-eliot-book-practical-cats-
andrew-lloyd-webber-taylor-swift [https://perma.cc/ZT8B-TNW8]. 
277 Jonathan Larson’s 1996 musical Rent, for example, was loosely based on Giacomo 
Puccini’s 1896 opera La Bohème. See Anthony Tommasini, Like Opera Inspiring It, ‘Rent’ 
Is Set to Endure, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/06/
arts/music/06rent.html [https://perma.cc/F49M-MD76]. 
278 Patrick Healy, Like the Movie, Only Different, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2013), https://
www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/movies/hollywoods-big-bet-on-broadway-adaptations.
html [https://perma.cc/B885-LYWX]. 
279 See Aylesworth, supra note 18. 
280 See supra Part II.B. 
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use is “too indeterminate a doctrine to provide a reliable touchstone 
for future conduct.”281 
The remainder of this Part offers and examines three best prac-
tices for theatrical artists, creators, and producers to employ when 
putting pen to paper, whether writing a new musical or play, or 
whether bringing a script to the stage: (1) ensure that the work being 
created is an entirely original idea, or, based off of a property that is  
unquestionably in the public domain; (2) if the first option is impos-
sible, obtain explicit licenses, clearances, or permissions from  
relevant copyright holders; and (3) if all else fails, look to legal  
resource organizations in the theatre industry for litigation support 
and prepare an extraordinarily strong fair use defense for your po-
tential day in court. 
A. Original Work and The Public Domain 
It is generally considered to be both difficult and atypical within 
the commercial theatre industry for a bona fide original piece of  
theatre to arrive on Broadway.282 In fact, this specific observation 
was presented directly to the audience before each performance  
of the original 2018 Broadway musical, Gettin’ the Band  
Back Together: “In a scripted welcome before the curtain, Ken  
Davenport, the lead producer and a co-author of the [show’s] book,  
delivers a supercharged spiel[:] ‘What you’re about to see is one  
of those rare things on Broadway these days . . . A totally original  
musical.’”283 
 
281 James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 192 (2005). 
282 Logan Culwell-Block, 15 Completely Original Musicals Every Theatre Fan Should 
Know, PLAYBILL (Oct. 5, 2018), http://www.playbill.com/article/15-completely-original-
musicals-every-theatre-fan-should-know [https://perma.cc/9D6Z-SMND] (arguing that 
new musicals “are often based on source material, be it a film, a book, a play,” and that 
original musicals, “meaning shows without any source material whatsoever,” have 
generally been “the exception, not the rule”); Peter Marks, Broadway’s Producers: A 
Struggling, Changing, Breed, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
1996/04/07/theater/broadway-s-producers-a-struggling-changing-breed.html 
[https://perma.cc/5F7V-5CC5] (illustrating that Broadway was once “a fertile field” for 
original dramas and musicals in the early twentieth century, but that the industry has since 
become “hard and unyielding” for such works, and that instead, over the decades, revivals 
and long-running mega-musicals have taken over Broadway). 
283 Jesse Green, Review: Familiar Rock Dreams in ‘Gettin’ the Band Back Together’, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/13/theater/review-gettin-
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From a legal perspective, that rare, new, original stage play is 
the truest way to safeguard theatre industry professionals against 
copyright infringement suits, given the prevailing uncertainties 
around the fair use doctrine and the test of transformativeness. If a 
musical or play is written or opens with no validly copyrighted un-
derlying material in its script, plaintiffs seeking to sue writers or 
producers for infringement will lack proper legal standing to do 
so.284 Further, because the Supreme Court has described fair use as 
an affirmative defense, such doctrine will not even need to be raised 
in litigation if a plaintiff fails to show a prima facie case of copyright 
infringement.285 
However, given both the intellectual and commercial challenges 
of conceiving and mounting an original play or musical, theatre  
artists, creators, or producers may feel the need or desire to draw 
inspiration from previously existing material. If this is the case, then 
the public domain offers the safest possible route to avoid copyright 
litigation later on. In essence, the public domain refers to the catalog 
of creative materials that are not protected by intellectual property 
laws, which means that the public owns the works and that anyone 
can use the works without obtaining permission.286 
There are several ways for works to become part of the public 
domain. One common way is for their copyrights to expire. Since 
January 1, 2019, upon each new year, all works governed by the  
Copyright Act of 1909 will enter the public domain at the end of the 
 
the-band-back-together-broadway.html [https://perma.cc/EB83-ZJP4]. Also, the new, 
original musicals, while rare, are not unheard of (notable examples include A Chorus Line, 
Come From Away, Dear Evan Hansen, and Hedwig and the Angry Inch, among others). 
284 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., COPYRIGHT BASICS—CIRCULAR 1, https://www. 
copyright.gov/circs/circ01.pdf [https://perma.cc/87Y7-G6AG] (“Before an infringement 
suit may be filed in court, registration (or refusal) is necessary for works of U.S. origin.”); 
see also Standing to Sue in Copyright Infringement Suits, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 200 (1961) 
(asserting that the Copyright Act gives only “copyright proprietors” the right to sue for 
infringement); see also generally TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum, 839 F.3d 168 (2d 
Cir. 2016) (a case in which plaintiffs lost due to failure to demonstrate standing). 
285 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
286 Rich Stim, Welcome to the Public Domain, STAN. U. LIBR. COPYRIGHT & FAIR USE 
OVERVIEW, https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/public-domain/welcome/ [https://perma.
cc/AP2Y-3E39]. 
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95th calendar year from publication.287 For example, the copyright 
for all works published in the United States in the year 1923 expired 
on January 1, 2019.288 On January 1, 2020, this took effect for all 
works published in 1924—and this will continue so on and  
so forth.289 However, for works published on or after January 1, 
1978, the copyright lasts for the full life of the author plus an  
additional seventy years.290 
Another way for works to become part of the public domain is 
for a copyright holder to expressly place the work into the public 
domain by dedicating it to the public.291 While this method for 
works to enter the public domain is “rare,” it is not unheard of in the 
theatrical space.292 For example, in 2000, National Public Radio 
deemed American playwright Charles L. Mee the “Public-Domain 
Playwright” for his decision to make “the texts of his plays freely 
available on the Web, and forgo . . . royalties.”293 Mee, who  
contends that there is “no such thing as an original play,” runs a 
website called “the (re)making project,” through which users may 
download and use the texts of any of Mee’s plays for free.294 Mee 
encourages anyone to “pillage” his plays and use his texts to “build 
your own, entirely new, piece—and then, please, put your own name 
to the work that results.”295 
Many well-known theatrical properties have been inspired by 
works from the public domain. Most recently, Hadestown, the  
winner of the 2019 Tony Award for Best Musical, “borrows the 
 
287 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., DURATION OF COPYRIGHT—CIRCULAR 15A, 
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ15a.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3VX-5JX5] [hereinafter 
DURATION OF COPYRIGHT]. 
288 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105–298, 112 Stat. 2827 
(1998). 
289 Id. 
290 See DURATION OF COPYRIGHT, supra note 287. 
291 Phillip Johnson, ‘Dedicating’ Copyright to the Public Domain, 71 MOD. L. REV. 587 
(2008). 
292 See Stim, supra note 286. 
293 Charles Mee, Public-Domain Playwright, NPR (Aug. 17, 2000), https://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=1080842 [https://perma.cc/N3ET-TZEW]. 
294 Charles Mee, About the (Re)making Project, (RE)MAKING PROJECT, 
http://www.charlesmee.org/about.shtml [https://perma.cc/K3PN-D6BV]. 
295 Id. (note, however, that Mee requests artists to clear performance rights if people want 
to perform his play “essentially or substantially as I have composed them”). 
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myths of Orpheus and Eurydice, and of Hades and Persephone and 
marries them in a New Orleans jazz-folk-musical retelling of the  
ancient Greek tales.”296 Hadestown’s book writer and composer, 
Anaïs Mitchell, ostensibly did not need to obtain any licenses or  
permissions to use age-old Greek mythology—clearly part of the 
public domain—as a storytelling premise. The works of William 
Shakespeare offer another example of a popular source of inspira-
tion for stage plays in the public domain. Swapping out the Capulets 
and the Montagues for the Sharks and the Jets, the classic 1957  
musical West Side Story is essentially a retelling of Romeo and  
Juliet.297 Within the storyline of the Tony-winning 1948 musical 
Kiss Me, Kate, the show’s lead characters perform a musical version 
of Shakespeare’s The Taming of the Shrew.298 Most recently, The 
Public Theater in New York City put up musicalized versions of 
both As You Like It and Twelfth Night through its Shakespeare in  
the Park summer series, and each musical included new, “jaunty  
and entertaining” musical numbers in between Shakespeare’s  
original text.299 
While the public domain offers a safe haven for inspired  
creators, a pertinent inquiry for those borrowing from the public  
domain is ensuring that all elements being borrowed or used are  
indeed in the public domain.300 This was a central issue in the 2011 
case of Canal+ Image UK Ltd. v. Lutvak.301 In Canal+, the plaintiff, 
 
296 Hayley Levitt, In Hadestown, What Is Myth and What Is Musical?, THEATERMANIA 
(May 11, 2019), https://www.theatermania.com/broadway/news/in-hadestown-what-is-
myth-and-what-is-musical_88694.html [https://perma.cc/9QA8-UTZA]. 
297 Leonard Bernstein and West Side Story, FOLGER SHAKESPEARE LIBR., 
https://www.folger.edu/shakespeare-unlimited/west-side-story-leonard-bernstein 
[https://perma.cc/2NAW-2VSJ]. 
298 The Gender Politics of ‘Kiss Me, Kate,’ FOLGER SHAKESPEARE LIBR., https://
www.folger.edu/shakespeare-unlimited/kiss-me-kate [https://perma.cc/XXS2-VY2B]. 
299 Logan Culwell-Block, 12 Musicals on Broadway and Beyond That Came from 
Shakespeare Plays, PLAYBILL (Sept. 29, 2018), http://www.playbill.com/article/12-
musicals-on-broadway-and-beyond-that-came-from-shakespeare-plays 
[https://perma.cc/UY5A-9XA5]. 
300 For example, look to translation: per section 7 of the 1909 Copyright Act, if you 
translate an old work that of itself is in the public domain, the translation itself would be 
protected by copyright because the translation would be considered a derivative work; see 
also Copyright and Scholarship: Public Domain, B.C. LIBR., https://libguides.bc.edu/ 
copyright/publicdomain [https://perma.cc/V5TQ-R5LS]. 
301 773 F. Supp. 2d 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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a production company, owned the copyright to the 1949 film Kind 
Hearts and Coronets, a comic adaptation of “Israel Rank,” a 1907 
novel by Roy Horniman.302 The 1949 film, which “tells essentially 
the same story” as the novel, was famous for the lead performance 
of Sir Alec Guinness, who played eight different characters  
murdered by the story’s protagonist.303 Canal+ argued in litigation 
that this element of “having all of the murder victims played by the 
same leading comic actor [was] central to the artistic expression” of 
“Kind Hearts and Coronets.”304 
In 2003, Canal+ entered into a licensing agreement with  
defendants, Steven Lutvak and Robert L. Freedman, for them to 
adapt the film into a stage musical.305 The following year, Canal+, 
acting within its contractual rights, decided not to proceed further in 
production of the musical with the defendants.306 However, Lutvak 
and Freedman continued to develop their musical, and revised it to 
remove elements unique to the copyrighted film, but still maintained 
the general plot of the 1907 novel, which had passed into the public 
domain.307 As such, their musical in draft form continued to “use 
one actor to play all of the victims.”308 
Following an early 2010 announcement309 about a pre-Broad-
way commercial production of the musical, which was eventually 
titled A Gentleman’s Guide to Love and Murder (“Gentleman’s 
Guide”), Canal+ sued, arguing that the musical “retained the central 
[element] of ‘Kind Hearts and Coronets:’ the comedy inherent in 
having all eight of the aristocratic murder victims played by a single 
 
302 Id. at 424. 
303 Id. at 425. 
304 Id. 
305 See id. 
306 See id. at 425–26. 
307 IP/Entertainment Case Law Updates: Canal+ Image UK Ltd. v. Lutvak, LOEB & 
LOEB, LLP (Mar. 29, 2011), https://www.loeb.com/en/insights/publications/2011/04/ 
canal-image-uk-ltd-v-lutvak [https://perma.cc/B94S-6BQA] [hereinafter LOEB & LOEB, 
LLP]. 
308 Canal+, 773 F. Supp. 2d at 426. 
309 Kenneth Jones, Mays to Star in Premiere of Gentleman’s Guide Musical at La Jolla 
Playhouse; Season Announced, PLAYBILL (Jan. 24, 2010), http://www.playbill.com/article/ 
mays-to-star-in-premiere-of-gentlemans-guide-musical-at-la-jolla-playhouse-season-
announced-com-165224 [https://perma.cc/4SJH-W69U]. 
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actor.”310 Defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that Canal+ 
failed to state a claim for copyright infringement.311 
The Southern District of New York dismissed Canal+’s claim.312 
It cited precedent from the Second Circuit to first note that in “the 
case of a derivative work based on an underlying work that is in the 
public domain, only the material added to the underlying work is 
protected by copyright.”313 The court found that the film “Kind 
Hearts and Coronets” contained “limited original elements” com-
pared to the original novel.314 As such, the court disagreed with the 
central argument made by Canal+ and decided that the dramatic  
device of having one actor play multiple roles is not only not pro-
tectible, but that it is simply “use of a standard convention.”315 
Moreover, the court stated that while the dramatic device of the 
composite victim “may add to the amusement” of both the film and 
the new musical, it decided that it was hardly the “heart and soul” of 
either work.316 Ultimately, the defendants won because their use  
of the material cautiously and properly toed the line of content it 
borrowed from the original novel in the public domain (which con-
stituted permissible use) versus that from the film (which they would 
not have been allowed to use).317 This level of caution was critical 
to the defendants’ victory, and thanks to the novel’s existence in the 
public domain, development on Gentleman’s Guide continued 
thereafter, and the show ultimately won the 2014 Tony Award for 
Best Musical.318 
To be sure, the public domain offers a legally dependable avenue 
for theatre practitioners seeking to borrow previous material;  
 
310 Canal+, 773 F. Supp. 2d at 426. 
311 See id. 
312 See id. at 446. 
313 Id. at 430 (quoting Waldman Publ’g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 782 (2d Cir. 
1994)). 
314 Id. at 433. 
315 Id. 
316 Canal+, 773 F. Supp. 2d at 439. 
317 See LOEB & LOEB, LLP, supra note 307. 
318 See Patrick Healy, 2014 Tony Awards: ‘Gentleman’s Guide’ and ‘All the Way’ Are 
Named Top Shows, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/ 
theater/theaterspecial/audra-mcdonald-and-neil-patrick-harris-win-acting-honors.html 
[https://perma.cc/9MK8-82UC]. 
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however, one non-legal consideration worth making is the  
potentially lost sense of a truly new, creative artistic expression. The 
use of material in the public domain generally means the use of  
material that the mass public already knows about in some capacity. 
As such, simply regurgitating an age-old story is unlikely to drive 
modern audiences to a show. 
In order to create an artistically novel work, then, theatre  
practitioners creating works borrowed from the public domain will 
need to imbue their shows with a sense of newness and immediacy. 
For example, rather than repeating the story of “The Wizard of Oz,” 
the 2003 musical Wicked tells the origin story of the Wicked Witch 
of the West, giving her the name Elphaba—inspired by the phonetic 
pronunciation of the initials of L. Frank Baum, the author of  
the 1900 children’s novel, “The Wonderful Wizard of Oz,” which  
is in the public domain.319 In another example, the previously  
mentioned Hadestown sets an ancient Greek myth to New Orleans-
style music and its initial Broadway production was “inventively 
staged.”320 Altogether, the use of material from the public domain 
will require a balancing test for theatre creators between the legal 
(yes, it is lawful) and the creative (but is it artistically interesting?) 
and is ultimately only one option for theatre practitioners in their 
creators’ toolkit. 
B. Licensing, Clearances, and Permissions 
Another way to attempt to circumvent copyright infringement 
litigation in one’s new musical or play is by obtaining a license, 
clearance, or permission from the relevant copyright holder for use 
of previous material in the new work.321 
In some instances, this may simply entail figuring out who the 
controlling party or estate is to a copyright and asking him or her for 
 
319 See Eriq Gardner, Warner Bros. Wins Key Legal Ruling Impacting All ‘Wizard of Oz’ 
Remakes (Exclusive), HOLLYWOOD REP. (July 6, 2011, 11:40 AM), https://www.
hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/warner-bros-wins-key-legal-208255 
[https://perma.cc/Q2DW-Y4MU]. 
320 Jonathan Mandell, Hadestown on Broadway: Review, Pics, Video, N.Y. THEATER 
BLOG (Apr. 17, 2019), https://newyorktheater.me/2019/04/17/hadestown-on-broadway 
[https://perma.cc/Q42K-LYDM]. 
321 See Stim, supra note 15. 
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permission. In the arguably small world of musical theatre, this may 
be facile enough through preexisting professional or personal  
relationships. For example, when Lin-Manuel Miranda, in the  
process of writing Hamilton, decided to insert a line into the show 
from an existing Jason Robert Brown musical, Miranda—who  
already knew Brown—simply sent Brown a text message asking if 
he could use the line.322 Brown then replied to Miranda: “Go, write, 
be happy. I extend my blessing.”323 This request—indeed, as casual 
as a text message—effectively constituted a clearance.324 After such 
an informal request, however, it would be wise for the new user to 
follow up with the copyright holder with a more detailed, formal 
written instrument specifying additional deal terms as necessary, 
and should probably not officially use the work until such a contract 
has been fully executed.325 Additionally, because not everybody has 
preexisting industry connections, many artists or producers may 
benefit from hiring a music rights clearance expert to assist in  
navigating the intricate music licensing landscape.326 
 




324 See Rich Stim, The Basics of Getting Permission, STAN. U. LIBR. COPYRIGHT & FAIR 
USE OVERVIEW, https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/introduction/getting-permission/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZPW9-YD56]. 
325 Interview with Susan Mindell, Partner, Entertainment/Theatre Law Firm Levine 
Plotkin & Menin, LLP, in N.Y., N.Y. (Sept. 3, 2019) (Mindell explained further that such 
a formal follow-up written instrument should include specific details about the work being 
used, reasons for its use, and material terms for the use, such as how long it will be used 
for, how many times it will be used, etc. In addition, for those obtaining permissions from 
musical theater writers and composers, such as Jason Robert Brown, copyright users should 
ensure that the formal written instrument requires the copyright holder to instruct the 
relevant licensing organization that owns the rights to the property itself—such as, for 
example, how Music Theatre International owns the licensing rights for Brown’s The Last 
Five Years—to authorize any such licenses for a new use.). 
326 See Iser, supra note 14 (stating that Deborah Mannis-Gardner worked as “the music 
clearance guru . . . responsible for clearing all of Lin-Manuel Miranda’s references to 
musical theatre and popular music”); Sopan Deb, How Can ‘Moulin Rouge! The Musical’ 
Upstage the Movie? With 70 Songs, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/07/17/theater/moulin-rouge-musical-songs.html [https://perma.cc/L3MF-MNN7] 
(stating that the lead producer of Moulin Rouge! hired a music producer named Janet Billig 
Rich “to help with the clearances”). 
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Ultimately, when obtaining clearances and permissions, it is  
important for copyright users to have as comprehensive an  
understanding as possible how he or she would or might like to use 
the original work. A “grand rights license,” for example, is what any 
user will need to obtain from a copyright holder in order to use parts 
of a previously copyrighted musical composition in a dramatic  
performance that tells a narrative story, or, in other words, a musical 
or stage play.327 If a new musical’s creative team has plans to  
produce a cast recording or album, the copyright user will also need 
to obtain a “mechanical license” from the copyright holder in order 
to distribute CDs or records that contain the copyrighted material 
therein.328 Moreover, if producers have intentions to mount interna-
tional productions of a show, rights shall need to be cleared for the 
relevant territories.329 
Moulin Rouge!, which opened on Broadway in 2019, offers a 
case study of licensing and clearances for a new musical.330 The 
show is the stage version of Baz Luhrmann’s 2001 film, which  
became known partly for its wide-ranging jukebox soundtrack,  
including the likes of popular musical artists such as Elton John, 
Madonna, and The Police, to name just a few. Over a decade after 
the film’s debut, when a creative team assembled to develop a 
Broadway stage production of the film, the team made a commit-
ment to “more music,” which resulted in a final set list of musical 
numbers for the Broadway show that includes 70 songs credited to 
161 writers.331 The list, updated for newer ears, includes an array of 
full tracks and samples from songs including Lady Gaga’s “Bad  
Romance,” Katy Perry’s “Firework,” and Sia’s “Chandelier.”332 
 
327 See Common Licensing Terms Defined, ASCAP, https://www.ascap.com/help/ascap-
licensing/licensing-terms-defined [https://perma.cc/XF86-LYTP]. 
328 Rebecca Milzoff, How Broadway’s ‘Moulin Rouge!’ Got the Rights to ‘Torn,’ ‘Don’t 
Speak’ & More Pop Smashes, BILLBOARD (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.billboard.com/ 
articles/news/broadway/8527999/moulin-rouge-broadway-soundtrack-rights-pop-hits 
[https://perma.cc/N7EM-QGQJ]. 
329 See Deb, supra note 326. 
330 See id.; see also Milzoff, supra note 328. 
331 See Deb, supra note 326. 
332 Madison Malone Kircher, You Can Tell Everybody These Are All the Songs in 
Broadway’s Moulin Rouge, VULTURE (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.vulture.com/2019/08/ 
moulin-rouge-broadway-soundtrack-full-list-of-songs.html [https://perma.cc/6HGN-
K5FK]. 
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The creative team for Moulin Rouge! enlisted the assistance of a 
music supervisor to help obtain grand rights to use the songs in the 
show.333 Each agreement had highly specific deal terms, because  
the “permissions and costs vary depending on how much of an  
individual song is in the musical and for how long.”334 Moreover, 
each agreement had to be approved by each and every composer and 
publisher who held rights to a particular song, even if it did not  
include the original performer of the song itself.335 While some 
songwriters, such as Lorde and David Byrne, agreed quickly to  
licensing grand rights to Moulin Rouge!, others did not sign off—
notably, Bruno Mars was the only one of eleven credited song- 
writers of “Uptown Funk” to decline its use in the show.336 Now, 
following the clearances process, the 161 songwriters who signed 
off on the show receive a royalty payment upon each performance 
of Moulin Rouge!337 Further, the creative team successfully secured 
mechanical rights from pertinent songwriters, and a cast recording 
of the Broadway production was released in 2019.338 
One potential caveat of asking for a license or permission is that 
if a copyright holder declines authorization of a new user’s right to 
use the material, that copyright holder is effectively on alert for the 
user’s planned work.339 This is essentially what transpired in the  
Canal+ case: because the production company plaintiff was already 
aware that the defendant writers had created a draft of a musical 
connected to their copyrighted material, they already had a litigious 
hat on by the time they discovered that a production of Gentleman’s 
Guide was ready to debut.340 
 
333 See Deb, supra note 326. 
334 Id. 
335 Id. (demonstrating that the use of Britney Spears’s song “Toxic” in the musical “did 
not require Ms. Spears’s permission . . . but four songwriters had to give the thumbs up”). 
336 See Milzoff, supra note 328. 
337 Id. 
338 Id. 
339 Interview with Steven Chaikelson, Head of the Theatre Management & Producing 
Concentration, Columbia Univ. Sch. of the Arts Theatre Program, in N.Y., N.Y. (May 24, 
2019). 
340 See Canal+ Image UK Ltd. v. Lutvak, 773 F. Supp. 2d 419, 425–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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However, in an instance like Hamilton, the payoffs of under- 
taking a clearances process evidently outweigh the risk of surrepti-
tiously sneaking a reference or two into a new work: “Not only are 
none of Miranda’s sources of inspiration or lyrics suing  
Miranda, they are lining up to praise him.”341 In an interview with 
Forbes, Deborah Mannis-Gardner—the music rights clearances  
expert who cleared the references in Hamilton—noted that Miranda 
specifically wanted to pay homage and tribute to those he referenced 
in the show: “By clearing the songs, Lin was tipping his hat to the 
hip-hop community . . . . When he wrote [Hamilton], he was listen-
ing to Notorious B.I.G. and Eminem . . . . It was as if Lin wanted to 
take that community of hip hop and rap and make the rest of the 
world recognize that music.”342 
The use of licensing and clearances for a new theatrical work 
offers both pros and cons. As for pros, theatre practitioners may en-
courage audience members to see a show because of the promise 
that they will recognize material in the show.343 Further, it may per-
fectly suit the creative endeavor of a particular show to have certain 
pieces of copyrighted material in it.344 As for cons, some may find 
there to be a lost sense of total originality in the final form of the 
show, since not everything is entirely new.345 Moreover, once li-
cense agreements are effectuated, producers then have to cut a check 
 
341 Larry Iser, ‘Hamilton’ and Copyright: Lin-Manuel Miranda Had His Eyes on Music 
History, FORBES (June 16, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legal
entertainment/2016/06/16/hamilton-and-copyright-lin-manuel-miranda-had-his-eyes-on-
music-history/#2130abd50f8b [https://perma.cc/3ZF5-W3PD]. 
342 See Iser, supra note 14. 
343 Madison Malone Kircher, I Hated Moulin Rouge! on Broadway but I Can’t Stop 
Listening to It, VULTURE (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.vulture.com/2019/09/the-moulin-
rouge-broadway-cast-album-is-surprisingly-good.html [https://perma.cc/XQ5W-T6QC] 
(“What’s difficult, and what Moulin Rouge! does right, is mashing songs you already 
recognize and, ideally, like.”). 
344 Michael Paulson, Lin-Manuel Miranda, Creator and Star of ‘Hamilton,’ Grew Up on 
Hip-Hop and Show Tunes, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/08/16/theater/lin-manuel-miranda-creator-and-star-of-hamilton-grew-up-on-hip-
hop-and-show-tunes.html [https://perma.cc/LY87-SB54] (quoting Hamilton creator Lin-
Manuel Miranda, who thought that Alexander Hamilton’s difficult childhood echoed of 
Jay Z, Eminem, and Biggie Smalls: “I recognized the arc of a hip-hop narrative in 
Hamilton’s life”). 
345 Marilyn Stasio, Broadway Review: ‘Moulin Rouge!’, VARIETY (July 25, 2019, 3:00 
PM), https://variety.com/2019/legit/reviews/moulin-rouge-review-broadway-musical-2-
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following every performance week, which affects the amount that 
can be paid back to investors, as well as the speed of  
production recoupment.346 
In the end, though, the process of rights clearances is actually an 
area of the law in which lawyers may achieve a rare moment of  
public acknowledgment. The day that the Broadway cast album for 
Moulin Rouge! was released, Twitter user @kafine tweeted, “shout 
out to the lawyer who negotiated music clearances for  
moulin rouge.”347 
C. The Four Factors of Fair Use and Legal Resources for Theatre 
Industry Professionals 
If the above-listed strategies are unattainable, and a theatre artist, 
creator, or producer is served with a copyright infringement suit, the 
final remaining strategy is to ensure the preparation of an extraordi-
narily strong fair use defense. As this Note has examined, fair use is 
a mystifying affirmative defense in litigation; however, there are 
certain elements to keep in mind to strengthen the assertion of the 
defense in court. Defendants asserting fair use should look primarily 
to the four statutory factors of the defense laid out in 17 U.S.C.  
§ 107 and recognize the circumstances during which the assertion of 
fair use is likelier to prevail. This section serves as a very brief  
“go-to guide” to understand when and how the four statutory factors 
weigh in favor of or against fair use. Additionally, theatre profes-
sionals may seek the counsel or assistance of organizations such as 
The Dramatists Legal Defense Fund during litigation.348 
 
1203278036/ [https://perma.cc/NAV4-DW7H] (cautioning that for any jukebox musical, 
“good as you are, you’re still at the mercy of memory”). 
346 Interview with Marc Hershberg, Associate at the Entertainment/Theatre Law Firm 
Cowan, DeBaets, Abrahams & Sheppard LLP, in N.Y., N.Y. (Oct. 25, 2019); see also Deb, 
supra note 326 (“Each night the cast [of Moulin Rouge!] takes the stage, the 161 composers 
receive a royalty payment, which is proportional to how long a given song is in the show 
and based on a cut of revenue.”). 
347 Kaitlin Fine (@kafine), TWITTER (Aug. 30, 2019, 1:27 PM), https://twitter.com/
kafine/status/1167488981006790656 [https://perma.cc/P2NK-FVA8]. 
348 See Aylesworth, supra note 18 (“For those artists who choose to create works that 
would survive a fair use test, but nevertheless get challenged by the underlying rights 
owners, organizations such as The Dramatists Legal Defense Fund have significantly 
contributed to protecting their First Amendment rights, not to mention a number of 
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1. Purpose and Character of the Use 
When looking to the first statutory factor, courts are likelier to 
find that nonprofit education and noncommercial uses are fair.349 
However, this is not a bright line, and courts generally weigh this 
first factor against the other three factors.350 Moreover, pursuant to 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell, courts generally con-
sider transformative uses to be fair.351 Courts are likelier to find a 
use not to be fair in this first factor if the new use does not effectively 
“transform” the original work, or if the defendant simply copies or 
reuses the original material, particularly in a commercial setting. 
For most properties in the theatre space, then, defendants should 
seek to ensure that the use is effectively “transformative;” that it 
somehow relates back to the copyrighted material by  
transforming it into something either entirely new or so considerably  
different from the original work that the use could no longer be  
considered as infringing. For example, if Hamilton were ever the 
subject of a copyright infringement case, most uses in the show 
could probably be argued as transformative: “Its hip-hop history  
lesson . . . incorporates musical works from the past with— 
undeniably—a completely different aesthetic, purpose, and  
audience than the original works.”352 
Defendants who can argue that their use functions as  
commentary, criticism, parody, or satire will also generally benefit 
from this first statutory factor.353 A recent proliferation in theatrical 
parody premieres in New York theatre suggest that many theatre 
professionals enjoy this protection, even when premiering  
unauthorized parodies.354 Certainly, parodic playwrights will also 
 
attorneys who worked for those without the financial resources to front the exorbitant costs 
of litigation.”). 
349 See MORE INFORMATION ON FAIR USE, supra note 267. 
350 See id. 
351 See id. 
352 See Iser, supra note 14. 
353 See supra Part II.B.3. 
354 David Gordon, From Full House to Hamilton, Theatrical Parodies Are All the Rage, 
THEATERMANIA (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.theatermania.com/off-broadway/news/ 
parody-musicals-off-broadway-special-report_82796.html [https://perma.cc/NXL8-
SMEY] (quoting Steven Brandon, the writer of Game of Thrones: The Rock Musical—An 
Unauthorized Parody: “We’re not using direct lines from the script . . . . We’re changing 
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have a stronger legal claim if the original author of the work in some 
way supports, endorses, or licenses the parody.355 However,  
playwrights should remain wary about relying on a parody defense: 
just because an author considers a new work to be a parody does not 
prevent an original rightsholder from suing.356 Moreover, the  
determination of whether a new stage play or musical effectively 
constitutes a parody is dependent on the particular judge.357 
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
When looking to the second statutory factor, courts are more 
likely to find fair use when a defendant has borrowed from a factual, 
informational, or educational work, as opposed to a creative or  
imaginative work.358 The use of a latter kind of work generally  
hinders a fair use argument because courts consider creative works 
to lie “closer to the heart of copyright.”359 Fortunately for most  
theatre defendants, courts generally consider this factor to assume 
“less importance in the overall fair use analysis relative to the other 
three factors,” but defendants will be better positioned if the work 
from which they borrow was not creative to begin with.360 Addition-
ally, this factor considers whether the work used was originally  
 
it enough that it’s different, but follows the same story.”); other recent off-Broadway 
parodies include The Big Bang Theory: A Pop-Rock Musical Parody, Friends! The Musical 
Parody, The Office! A Musical Parody, and Spamilton. 
355 See Lin-Manuel Miranda (@Lin_Manuel), TWITTER (Aug. 10, 2016), 
https://twitter.com/Lin_Manuel/status/763561586959187968 [https://perma.cc/X8PK-
HFCA] (showing that Hamilton creator Lin-Manuel Miranda attended a performance of 
the show’s off-Broadway parody, Spamilton, posted a photograph with the “talented young 
man” who plays Miranda in the parody, and “laughed [his] brains out”). 
356 See Gordon, supra note 354 (Andrew Lloyd Webber threatened the creators of 
Katdashians! Break the Musical!—a dual parody mashing up Cats and “Keeping Up With 
The Kardashians”—with legal action, “alleging that the show contained tunes taken 
directly from his long-running hit. Rather than go to court, the [creators of Katdashians!] 
quickly replaced the music with original material.”). 
357 See supra Part II.B.2. 
358 See MORE INFORMATION ON FAIR USE, supra note 267. 
359 Adjmi v. DLT Entm’t Ltd., 97 F. Supp. 3d 512, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting 
Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 948 F. Supp. 1214, 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 
137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
360 Id. 
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published or unpublished. The use of an unpublished work is likely 
to hurt a defendant’s claim of fair use.361 
3. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used 
When looking to the third statutory factor, courts consider “both 
the quantity and quality of the copyrighted material that was 
used.”362 If the use was large or substantial, fair use is less likely to 
be found.363 Similarly, if the use constituted “the heart” of the work, 
even if the use was quantitatively small, fair use is less likely to be 
found.364 Altogether, defendants have a stronger case if the use was 
quantitatively minimal or from a qualitatively insignificant part of 
the original work. 
Appropriate defendants may also seek to assert the de minimis 
defense in order to argue that the material used was so small that  
it ought to be permitted.365 If a court were to accept the de minimis 
defense, the fair use analysis would not even need to be con-
ducted.366 An example of a use that could ostensibly be protected 
under a de minimis defense—were it ever to be challenged—is the 
song “A Musical” from the 2015 Broadway musical Something  
Rotten!367 “A Musical” is a large-scale production number toward 
the middle of the show’s first act, which features “rapid-fire” refer-
ences to over twenty different famous Broadway musicals, such as 
A Chorus Line, Les Misérables, and Sweeney Todd.368 The “nods” 
take many different forms, such as “lyrics, musical phrases or visual 
cues,” and are often presented so fleetingly that the song has been 
 
361 See MORE INFORMATION ON FAIR USE, supra note 267. 
362 Id. 
363 See id.; see also TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum, 839 F.3d 168, 185 (2d Cir. 
2016) (showing that “substantial copying” will prompt a court to find against fair use). 
364 See MORE INFORMATION ON FAIR USE, supra note 267. 
365 Rich Stim, Measuring Fair Use: The Four Factors, STAN. U. LIBR. COPYRIGHT & FAIR 
USE OVERVIEW, https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/fair-use/four-factors/#too_small_ 
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deemed “the reference races.”369 This is an example of a use that 
could be granted a de minimis defense.370 
4. Effect of the Use on the Potential Market 
Finally, when looking to the fourth statutory factor, courts  
examine the extent to which the defendant’s use has or may hurt  
the market for the copyright holder’s original work.371 If an unau-
thorized use has the potential to harm the market—such as for  
licensing or for sales—for the original work, courts are less likely to 
find fair use.372 
CONCLUSION 
In the words of attorney and stage producer Lindsay W. Bowen, 
“Everyone has their eyes on the stage.”373 Indeed, the commercial 
theatre industry is far from dead,374 and as total Broadway box  
office revenues hit new records year after year,375 producers are  
perpetually seeking out the next sensation, in hopes of scoring a 
Tony Award or landing on the rare blockbuster and raking in the  
big bucks. 
And yet, there seems to be a stark incongruity between commer-
cial titles and success on Broadway today. Some of Broadway’s  
biggest flops are those with the biggest, most commercially recog-
nizable brand names.376 By contrast, shows with arguably smaller 
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names but stronger word of mouth and Tony season buzz have 
achieved financial success on the Great White Way.377 This trend 
demonstrates that Broadway audiences are more discerning than one 
might expect. With limited real estate378 and limited performance 
options,379 theatergoers today are shelling out money for tickets 
where the boundary-pushing is happening on Broadway. They are 
willing—and sometimes even eager380—to see something new and 
fresh take place on stage, rather than revisit the old or familiar.381 
That Broadway is burgeoning reflects a fascinating cultural  
moment. Even as the world increasingly values technology and the 
immediate access of entertainment from the home, audiences  
nevertheless continue to attend live theater in record force.382  
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Perhaps singularly propelled by the cultural phenomenon of  
Hamilton, the fact remains: the commercial theatre industry is  
growing and evolving.383 And as theatrical producers’ pockets grow 
ever deeper, it is rather unsurprising that fair use has become a more 
commonly litigated issue for the industry in recent years. But just as 
the theatre industry continues to evolve, we should encourage the 
doctrine of fair use to evolve along with it. 
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